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IN THE NAME OF THE CHILD: RACE, GENDER, AND
ECONOMICS IN ADOPTIVE COUPLE V. BABY GIRL
Bethany R. Berger*
Abstract
On June 25,2013, the Supreme Court decided Adoptive Couple v. Baby
Girl, holding that the Indian Child Welfare Act did not permit the
Cherokee father in that case to object to termination of his parental rights.
The case was ostensibly about a dispute between prospective adoptive
parents and a biological father. But this Article demonstrates that it was
about a lot more than that. It was a microcosm of anxieties about Indian-
ness, race, and the changing nature of parenthood. While made in the name
of the child, moreover, the decision supports practices and policies that do
not forward and may even undermine children's interests.
Drawing on published and unpublished court records and testimony,
this Article reveals that the Court's portrayal of the facts of the case was
wrong. Instead of a deadbeat dad acting as a spoiler in the adoption of the
daughter he had abandoned, the birth father sought to parent his daughter
from the moment he learned his fiancee was pregnant. He was initially
prevented from learning of the adoption plan by the actions of the other
parties and their attorneys. The decision distorted the law as well, doing
violence to long-accepted interpretations of the statute at issue. Why did
the Court mischaracterize the facts and the law? This Article examines the
narratives of the interests of the child, racial color-blindness, and even
women's rights that surrounded the case to reveal that the decision in fact
rested on racialization and colonialism of Indian people, condemnation of
poor single mothers, economic interests of private adoption facilitators,
and the class divides in modern paths to parenthood.
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INTRODUCTION
This story starts with a little girl-known legally as Baby Girl, as Baby
Veronica in the media frenzy that surrounded her case, as Ronnie Brown to
her biological father and his family, and as Veronica Capobianco to the
couple that ultimately adopted her-who was removed when she was two
years old from the couple that wanted to adopt her and placed with her
biological father, then removed from him when she was four years old to
go back to the adoptive couple. Although the second removal-unlike the
first-occurred without a hearing as to her best interests, it was made
primarily in the name of that many-named child. This Article investigates
the case to argue that it in fact reflected concerns founded in race, gender,
and economics that have little to do with children's interests.
At birth, Veronica was placed by her mother, Christinna Maldonado,
with Melanie Duncan' and Matthew Capobianco (the Capobiancos).
Although Maldonado had begun negotiating with the Capobiancos months
before, it was not until Veronica was almost four months old that anyone
1. Although usually referred to as Melanie Capobianco by the media, Melanie's professional
name, and the name by which her attorneys referred to her in a recent pleading, is Melanie Duncan.
Compare Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs and Brief in Support, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl,
No. FA-2013-4 (Dist. Ct. Notawa Cnty. Okla. Nov. 1, 2013) (referring to the adoptive mother as
Melanie Duncan), with Ariane de Vogue, "Baby Veronica" Custody Case Rages On, ABC NEWS
(Sept. 11, 2013, 2:12 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2013/09/baby-veronica-custody-
case-rages-on/ (referring to the adoptive mother as Melanie Capobianco).
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informed her father, Dusten Brown, of the placement and planned
adoption. Brown immediately objected and sought custody. The South
Carolina courts found that Brown was a fit and loving father whose
parental rights could not be terminated under the Indian Child Welfare Act
(ICWA), and ordered Veronica placed in his custody.2
Eighteen months later, however, in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl,3 the
U.S. Supreme Court held that Brown had no right to object to the adoption
under ICWA.4 In July 2013, without a factual hearing, the South Carolina
Supreme Court ordered that Veronica be taken from her father and his wife
for the adoption to be finalized.5 In August 2013, Brown turned himself in
for criminal custodial interference rather than relinquish her, but the
Oklahoma courts issued an emergency stay, and the Governor of Oklahoma
initially declined to extradite him. Finally, on September 23, 2013, shortly
after her fourth birthday, the Browns reluctantly released Veronica to the
Capobiancos.6
From many perspectives-including those of parents of any kind, of
prospective adoptive parents, and of Native communities scarred by
generations of lost children-this is a heartbreaking story. This Article is
not another effort to capture that heartbreak. The media has extensively
covered it-or versions of it-including on an episode of Dr. Phil.7 This
Article instead examines the lenses of race, gender, and economics through
which the story has been filtered and understood, and their influence on the
opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court. It argues that in the name of the
nameless Baby Girl and her interests, the Court participated in a long-
standing trend of using children to forward racial, gender, and economic
agendas that violate the rights of their birth parents and, ultimately, the
interests of the children themselves.
Most striking in this case was the role of race. Before the U.S. Supreme
Court, the attorneys for the Capobiancos and the Guardian ad Litem (star
Supreme Court litigators Lisa Blatt and Paul Clement)8 argued that ICWA
was unconstitutional, race-based legislation. 9 The majority opinion rested
on statutory rather than constitutional arguments, only briefly noting that
its interpretation avoided unspecified "equal protection concerns,"1 but
2. See infra Section I.A.
3. 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013).
4. Id. at 2557.
5. See Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 746 S.E.2d 346, 347 (S.C. 2013), rev'd, 133 S. Ct.
2552.
6. See infra Section I.A.
7. Adoption Controversy: Battle over Baby Veronica, DR. PHIL (June 6, 2013),
http://www.drphil.com/shows/show/I 895/.
8. See infra Section I.B.
9. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2570 n.3.
10. See id. at 2565.
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these arguments clearly influenced the judgment. In the first line of the
decision, the Court stated that "[tihis case is about a little girl (Baby Girl)
who is classified as an Indian because she is 1.2% (3/256) Cherokee.""1 As
discussed below, the statement was untrue on several levels and irrelevant
to the legal issues in the case, but it was consistent with an effort that has
existed since colonial times to erase Native peoples and their sovereignty
by facilitating the assimilation and absorption of Native individuals. In
Adoptive Couple, however, this longstanding campaign was repackaged in
the service of color-blindness. This Article examines this paradox as well
as its conflict with constitutional law, which has consistently, if not always
coherently, found that federal recognition of descent-based tribal identity
does not violate the constitution.
Gender played an important role in the case as well. The case facially
pitted the rights of birth mothers against those of birth fathers. The media,
moreover, sought to portray Brown as a deadbeat dad standing in the way
of Maldonado's efforts to find a better home for her child. Unpacking this
narrative, however, reveals trends far more threatening to both women and
their children. The current policies favoring adoption and reducing birth
parent rights emerged from the backlash against poor single mothers in the
1980s and 1990s and the proffering of adoption as a solution to both
illegitimacy and the increasing numbers of children in foster care. 12 As a
result, most states have sharply limited the rights of both birth fathers and
birth mothers in adoptions. 13 Before Adoptive Couple, ICWA cases were
among the few adoptions not subject to this trend.' 4
Although proponents justify these policy shifts with children's interests,
the justification rests on false premises. First, the demand for infants
relinquished at birth is so high that it is unaffected by ensuring meaningful
consent by birth parents before adoption.1 5 Second, the adoption industry
has little demand for children in the foster care population, who are mostly
not newborns, some of whose development has been affected by
mistreatment, and who are more likely to be African American-a group
facing significant discrimination in private adoptions. 16 Despite a decades-
long policy shift as well as billions of dollars spent on adoption subsidies
and adoption promotion, only one in five children exiting foster care leaves
through adoption. Of those that do, almost all are adopted by foster parents
and a significant fraction by extended-family foster parents.' 7 The
11. Id. at 2556.
12. See infra Section IV.B.
13. See infra Section IV.B.
14. See infra Section V.B.
15. See infra notes 174-94 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 189-90, 197-98 and accompanying text.
17. Infra notes 396-98 and accompanying text.
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determination that Brown had no right to consent, in other words, was
connected to policies that denigrate poor single mothers, diminish the
ability of both mothers and fathers to contest adoption, and reduce
financial and parenting support to poor families-all without meaningfully
affecting rates of adoption. Their net effect has been to harm both mothers
and children, particularly those of color.
The economic divides resulting from the impact of these policies are
also significant. First, class divides the two paths to parenthood presented
in the case and shapes the value attached to each path. The situation of the
Capobiancos-married, highly educated, seeking adoption after years of
unsuccessful treatment for infertility-is familiar and sympathetic to
upper-middle-class judges and lawyers. (Chief Justice John Roberts, for
example, is an adoptive father himself.)18 The situation of Dusten Brown-
unplanned father of a child whose mother did not want to marry him-is
perhaps more common but less familiar to upper-middle-class decision
makers, 19 and certainly less valorized in popular media. Are the
Capobiancos baby buyers or are they the family any right-thinking
biological father would want for his child? Is Brown a deadbeat dad or a
thwarted father just trying to make the best of a bad situation? Class may
be as important as race or gender in determining the answers to these
questions.
Perhaps more important than class are the economic interests of those
facilitating private adoptions. Outside of foster care and adoptions by
relatives, adoptions are largely conducted through private agencies,
attorneys, and facilitators. These entities charge large fees for their
services-in 2009, the average cost to adopt an infant was $32,000,20 and
highs around $100,000 have long been possible. 21 These private interests
depend on a supply of adoptable babies-an increasingly rare commodity
in the United States-and on completed adoptions. It is not surprising,
therefore, that both the American Academy of Adoption Attorneys and the
National Council for Adoption, which represents private adoption
agencies, 22 filed amicus briefs on behalf of the Capobiancos. 23
18. Infra note 471 and accompanying text.
19. See generally JUNE CARBONE & NAOMI CAHN, MARRIAGE MARKETS: How INEQUALITY is
REMAKING THE AMERICAN FAMILY 3-5, 8 (2014) (discussing class-based choices regarding whether
to marry).
20. Mariagiovanna Baccara, Allan Collard-Wexler, Leonardo Felli & Leeat Yariv, Gender
and Racial Biases: Evidence from Child Adoption 2 (CESifo Working Paper Series, Paper No.
2921, 2010), available at http://ssm.com/abstract--154571 1.
21. Laura Mansnerus, Market Puts Price Tag on the Priceless, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 1998),
http://www.nytimes.com/1998/10/26/us/market-puts-price-tags-on-the-priceless.html.
22. NAT'L COUNCIL FOR ADOPTION, FY2013 ANNUAL REPORT 7 (2013), available at
http://www.adoptioncouncil.org/files/large/109d5e2bf763e83 (describing membership as largely
adoption agencies, but including some adoption attorneys and "advocates").
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Finally, states may have economic interests in having children adopted
by upper-middle-class families rather than remaining with low income
ones. Because payments from the Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families program follow the child,24 removing children from a poor family
greatly reduces the state's obligation to provide such aid. Perhaps
recognizing the limited impact of adoption laws on rates of adoption or
welfare dependency, however, states did not intervene on behalf of the
Capobiancos. Instead, eighteen states submitted an amicus brief agreeing
that according full rights to birth fathers under ICWA was in the interests
of children and promoted just and stable adoptions.25
This Article explores the role that race, gender, and economics played
in Adoptive Couple and its popular reception. Part I outlines the facts and
law of the decision. Part II challenges the idea that the result in this case
served the best interests of children, relying on the facts of the case,
statistics regarding adoption and foster care, as well as the amicus briefs of
eighteen child welfare organizations and another eighteen states who
argued that the lower court's ruling furthered the best interests of children.
Part I1 discusses the role of race and the ways that assertions of racial
egalitarianism were used to replicate racial colonialism of Indian peoples.
Part IV discusses the role of gender, flipping the assertions of the rights of
birth mothers to show the connections between undermining Dusten
Brown's rights and undermining the rights of poor mothers generally. Part
V discusses the role of economics, including both the class divides
between adoptive parents and birth parents, and the economic interests of
those who facilitate adoptions and states charged with supporting poor
families.
I. FIXING THE FACTS, EXPLAINING THE LAW
This Part first attempts to correct the distortions of fact leading to the
decision in Adoptive Couple. It then describes the battle between legal
superstars in the U.S. Supreme Court and the legal flaws in the resulting
decision.
23. Brief for Am. Acad. of Adoption Attorneys as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013) (No. 12-399); Brief for Nat'l Council for
Adoption as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (No. 12-399).
24. Office of Child Welfare, Dep't of Children & Families, Maintenance Adoption Subsidy,
CT. FOR CHILD WELFARE 6 (Mar. 2012), http://centerforchildwelfare.finhi.usf.edu/kb/RevMax/
AdoptionSubsidyPresentationMar2012.pdf.
25. Brief of the States of Arizona, Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho,
Illinois, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, New Mexico, New York, NorthDakota, Oregon,
Washington, and Wisconsin as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents Birth Father and the
Cherokee Nation at 16, Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (No. 12-399) [hereinafter Brief of the
States].
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A. Facts
Most of the facts in Adoptive Couple are undisputed, but they have been
frequently misrepresented. This Section therefore presents the facts of the
case at some length, trying to the greatest extent possible to rely on those
facts presented in judicial opinions and sworn testimony credited by the
trial court.
Dusten Brown and Christinna Maldonado had dated on and off since
high school, but the off periods were long enough that Brown married, had
a child with, and divorced another woman, while Maldonado had two
children of her own with another man.26 They began dating again,
however, and in December 2008, Brown and Maldonado got engaged.27 At
that time, Brown-a soldier who received a Bronze Star for his service in
Iraq-lived at the Army Base in Fort Sill, Oklahoma, about four hours
away from Bartlesville and nearby Notawa, Oklahoma, where Brown grew
up and where his family and Maldonado both lived.28 In January 2009,
Maldonado told Brown she was pregnant; he responded by asking her to
move up their planned wedding.29 The family court found that Brown was
excited to learn of the pregnancy and "[i]nstead of shirking his
responsibilities, he implored [her] to move the wedding date forward" and
move into base housing with her two children so that she and the child
could "avail [themselves] of the benefits [they] were entitled to as military
dependents. 30
Maldonado refused, stopped taking Brown's calls, and in May 2009,
broke off their relationship by text message.3' In June, she sent him another
text asking whether he would rather pay child support or relinquish his
parental rights; he responded that he would rather relinquish his rights.32
He later testified that he hoped that this would cause her to rethink the
decision not to marry him.33 The family court found that Brown only
intended to agree to Maldonado's sole custody, and did not find credible
Maldonado's testimony that Brown was trying to avoid paying child
support. 34 Maldonado testified that Brown did not contact her after she
26. See Testimony of Dusten Brown-Direct Examination byMs. Jones at 477-78, Adoptive
Couple v. Baby Girl, 2009-DR-10-3803 (S.C. Fam. Ct. Sept. 14, 2011).
27. See Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 731 S.E.2d 550, 552 (S.C. 2012), rev'd, 133 S. Ct.
2552.
28. Id. at 553 & n.2.
29. Id. at 552-53.
30. Transcript of Record at 13, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, No. 2009-DR-10-03803 (S.C.
Fam. Ct. Sept. 29, 2011); see also Brief in Opposition, Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (No. 12-
399), 2012 WL 5994979, at *4-5 (citation omitted).
31. See Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 553.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Transcript of Record, supra note 30, at 15.
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texted him in June. 35 Yet Brown testified that Maldonado did not respond
to multiple text messages or open the door when he drove to Bartlesville to
see her.36 Further, Brown's mother testified that she called to offer
Maldonado money and hand-knitted baby things-twenty-four beaded
baby socks-but Maldonado did not reply.37 The family court found that
Brown "attempted to contact her on numerous occasions during her
pregnancy, and she denied his attempts," and that Brown's family had
"attempted to provide [the] birth mother with essentials for the minor
child, but she refused their efforts as well.,
38
Financially struggling, 39 Maldonado sought to place the baby for
adoption.40 Through a maze of adoption service providers, Maldonado was
connected with the Capobiancos of James Island, South Carolina. 41 The
Capobiancos had been through seven unsuccessful rounds of in vitro
fertilization and were seeking to adopt.42 Melanie Duncan Capobianco has
a Ph.D. in developmental psychology and works at home, consulting on
children's therapies, while Matthew Capobianco is an automotive
technician with Boeing.43  During Maldonado's pregnancy, the
Capobiancos paid her "rent, car payments, and utilities," and allegedly
gave Maldonado about $10,000 in financial assistance, not including her
medical fees, which were covered by the state.45
The notes from Maldonado's preplacement interview with the
Nightlight Christian Adoption Agency report that "[i]nitially the birth
35. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 569.
36. Suzette Brewer, The Fight for Baby Veronica, Part 2: The Devil's in the Details, INDIAN
COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA NETWORK (May 13, 2013) [hereinafter Brewer, The Fight for Baby
Veronica, Part 2], http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2013/05/13/fight-baby-veronica-
part-2-149336.
37. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 555 n.9; Testimony of Alice Brown-Direct Examination
by Ms. Jones at 564, 2009-DR-10-3803 (S.C. Fain. Ct. Sept. 14, 2011); Brewer, The Fightfor Baby
Veronica, Part 2, supra note 36.
38. Transcript of Record, supra note 30, at 13-14.
39. One (admittedly slanted) news report indicated that she was also paying child support for
her two other children. Suzette Brewer, Some Disturbing Facts About Baby Veronica's Birth
Mother, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY MEDA NETWORK (Aug. 12, 2013) [hereinafter Brewer, Some
Disturbing Facts], http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2013/08/12/selling-christy-
maldonado-150831 (discussing court records of child custody and child support disputes showing
that the court ordered Maldonado to pay $252 a month in child support to the father of her other
children--children who are being raised by their paternal grandmother).
40. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 570.
41. See infra notes 439-43 and accompanying text.
42. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 570.
43. See id. at 553, 579.
44. Transcript of Record, supra note 30, at 14.
45. See Suzette Brewer, The Fight for Baby Veronica, Part 1, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY
MEDIA NETWORK (May 6, 2013) [hereinafter Brewer, The Fight for Baby Veronica, Part 1],
http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2013/05/06/fight-baby-veronica-part- 1-149219.
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mother did not wish to identify the father, said she wanted to keep things
low-key as possible for the [Appellants], because he's registered in the
Cherokee tribe. It was determined that naming him would be detrimental to
the adoption."4 6 On August 21, 2009, the attorney the Capobiancos hired to
represent Maldonado's interests wrote to the Cherokee Nation of
Oklahoma:
My office is working with a South Carolina attorney in the
interstate placement of a baby to be born sometime in mid-
September. The baby's mother believes she is part-Cherokee,
and the baby's father is supposedly enrolled with the
Cherokee Nation.
... The birth father is: Dustin [sic] Dale Brown
(1/8 Cherokee, supposedly enrolled)
DOB:XX, XX, 1983[sic]
Born and raised in Oklahoma,
Presently in the army at Ft. Sill, Oklahoma
'.. the birth mother chose [the Capobiancos] to adopt her
baby and has been working with them for the past four to five
months . . . and she believes the father has no objection...
Could you let me know whether you would object to this
adoption by a non-Indian family-and whether the birth
mother, Christy, is eligible for a CDIB Card?47
The letter misspelled Brown's name as "Dustin" rather than "Dusten,"
and misstated the day and year-actually 198 1--of his birth.48 Maldonado
claimed that she told the attorney this information was incorrect,4 9 but the
Cherokee Nation did not receive correct information until five months
later.50 The Cherokee Nation responded that they could not find records of
Brown's enrollment, but that "[a]ny incorrect or omitted family
46. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 554 (second alteration in original).
47. Letter from Phyllis Zimmerman, Tulsa Attorney, to Myra Reed, Cherokee Nation Indian
Child Welfare Div. (Aug. 21, 2009), excerpted in Brewer, The Fight for Baby Veronica, Part 2,
supra note 36 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
48. Id.; see also Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 554; Testimony of Dusten Brown, supra
note 26, at 475-76.
49. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 554.
50. See id. at 555.
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documentation could invalidate this determination." 51
The August 21 letter is also interesting in other ways. First, as the letter
shows, although usually described as Hispanic, Maldonado claimed, and
later testified to, Cherokee heritage as well.52 Second, if Maldonado had in
fact been working with the Capobiancos for four to five months, she had
selected the family even before she ended her relationship with Brown.53
On September 15, 2009, Maldonado gave birth to a little girl.54 She
checked herself into the hospital as "strictly no report," meaning that the
hospital would tell anyone who called to inquire about Maldonado that she
was not there.5 5 Maldonado testified that she had done this with her two
previous births to avoid having the father of those children contact her.56
Brown did not know that Maldonado was in the hospital and did not try to
contact her there.57 The Capobiancos, however, were present at the birth.58
In fact, Matthew Capobianco cut the umbilical cord59 -a much-repeated
detail.61 Maldonado relinquished her parental rights the next morning,61
although ICWA would not permit relinquishment until ten days after
birth.62 After filing papers that did not indicate the baby's Native American
heritage with Oklahoma's Interstate Compact on Child Placement agency,
the Capobiancos received permission to remove her from the state, and
took her home to South Carolina later that month.63
The Capobiancos filed a petition to adopt Veronica on September 18,
2009, but did not provide notice of the planned adoption to Brown until
almost four months later, six days before Brown was scheduled to deploy
to Iraq.64 Although no court made a specific finding that the errors in the
notice to the Cherokee Nation or the delay in serving Brown were
deliberate, it would not be surprising if they were. Studies have found
51. Id. at 554 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
52. Id. at 554 n.5.
53. Melanie Duncan, however, testified that they first got into contact with Maldonado in late
June. Testimony of Adoptive Mother-Cross Examination by Ms. Jones at 202,2009-DR- 10-3803
(S.C. Fam. Ct. Sept. 13, 2011).
54. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 552.
55. Id. at 554 (internal quotation marks omitted).
56. Id. at 554 n.7.
57. See id.; Brewer, The Fight for Baby Veronica, Part 2, supra note 36.
58. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 554.
59. Id.
60. See, e.g., Adoptive Couple v. BabyGirl, 133 S. Ct. 2552,2558 (2013);Adoptive Couple,
731 S.E.2d at 554; Id. at 571.
61. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 554.
62. 25 U.S.C. § 1913(a) (2012).
63. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 554. As discussed below, had the papers indicated
Veronica's Cherokee heritage, the couple would not have been permitted to remove the baby from
the state. See infra note 69.
64. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 555.
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widespread noncompliance with ICWA. 65 Some of this non-compliance is
due to ignorance or carelessness, but there is evidence that it is also part of
a common technique to facilitate private adoptions of Indian children by
non-Indians.66 By placing a child with a hopeful family before providing
notice to a child's parents or tribe, agencies may create "facts on the
ground" 67 that make it less likely that the original illegal placement will be
disrupted. Further, although courts disagree, some have held that a long
placement with a non-Indian family may provide "good cause" to deviate
from ICWA's placement preferences. 68
The failure to establish the applicability of ICWA until the Capobiancos
returned to South Carolina may have been a key legal move as well. Had
Oklahoma authorities known that ICWA applied, they would have refused
65. See, e.g., Margaret Olesnavage et al., Disproportionate Minority Contact of American
Indians/Alaska Natives in the Child Welfare System of Michigan, MICH. B.J., Jan. 2010, at 32
(providing examples of ICWA non-compliance in Michigan); NAT'LCTR. FOR STATE COURTS &N.
Am. INDIAN LEGAL SERVS., INC., AN ANALYSIS OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE
ACT IN SOUTH DAKOTA: FINAL REPORT (2004) (analyzing surveys ofICWA noncompliance in South
Dakota), available at http://www.sdtribalrelations.com/icwa/icwa04analysis.pdf; see also Brief for
Wis. Tribes as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct.
2552 (2013) (No. 12-399), 2013 WL 1308821, at *6, *10-13 (noting that between 2005 and 2007,
Wisconsin tribes received notice in less than 18% of ICWA foster care and adoption cases, and
documenting other violations).
66. See Brief for Ass'n on Am. Indian Affairs, Nat'l Congress of Am. Indians, Nat'l Indian
Child Welfare Ass'n, Indian Tribes, and Other Indian Orgs. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents, Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (No. 12-399), 2013 WL 1279462, at *17-18
(discussing abusive adoption practices involving Indian children and noting that "Indian children
were placed in foster care far more frequently than non-Indian children"); Brief for Wis. Tribes as
Amici Curie, supra note 65, at 37-38 (discussing adoption practices in Wisconsin involving Indian
children); John Echohawk et al., The Adoption Industry's Ugly Side, POLITICO (Apr. 16,2013,5:21
AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/04/the-ugly-side-of-the-adoption-industry-90091 .html
("All across this country - but especially in states that are home to multiple Native American Tribes
- unethical adoption attorneys are purposely circumventing the federal law that is meant to protect
Native American children."); see, e.g., In re Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507, 517 (Ct. App. 1996)
(reporting that the father in the case did not admit that he was Indian on an adoption form after
being told that "the adoptions would be delayed or prevented if [Father's] Indian ancestry were
known"); In re Adoption of Infant Boy Crews, 803 P.2d 24, 27 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991) ("[Adoption
counselor] advised [the birth mother] not to mention her Indian blood to anyone, stating, 'What I
don't hear, I don't know."'), aff'd, 825 P.2d 305 (Wash. 1992).
67. "Facts on the ground" is a diplomatic term first used to describe efforts to establish
settlements in disputed parts of territory claimed by Israel, and thereby cement abstract claims to the
territory with the reality of occupation by individuals and families. See Nomi Maya Stolzenberg,
Facts on the Ground, in PROPERTY AND COMMUNITY 108-09 (Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo M.
Pefialver eds., 2010). Similarly, placing a child, even illegally, with a family makes it less likely
that a court will later disturb the placement.
68. See In re Adoption of B.G.J., 111 P.3d 651, 659 (Kan. Ct. App. 2005), aff'd, 133 P.3d 1
(Kan. 2006); see also OKLA. STAT. tit. 10A, § 1-1-102B.6. (2014) (recognizing that permanency is
relevant to determining best interests of the child).
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to permit Veronica's removal from the state until they were satisfied that
the placement complied with ICWA.69 Had the required notice to Brown
and the tribe been made before Veronica's placement with the
Capobiancos, the Oklahoma courts would almost certainly have
determined that Brown was entitled to custody under the act.7 ° Even if the
Oklahoma courts had determined that Brown did not have rights under
ICWA, Oklahoma law would require that he be provided with notice and
an opportunity to establish that his efforts to parent his child had been
thwarted before terminating his parental rights.71 Most important, had the
case been considered without the backdrop of Veronica's long placement
with the Capobiancos, there would have been little reason to prevent a fit
and loving father from parenting his child.
On January 6, 2010, while Brown's unit was on lockdown awaiting
imminent deployment, the Washington County Sheriffs Office of
Oklahoma called Brown and told him that he had to come to Bartlesville to
sign some paperwork.72 Brown was not allowed to travel to Bartlesville,
but wangled permission to meet the process server at a mall parking lot
near his army base.73 There, the process server gave Brown papers stating
that Brown was not contesting the adoption of Baby Girl.74 Brown signed,
69. See Cherokee Nation v. Nomura, 160 P.3d 967, 977 (Okla. 2007) (holding that the
administrator of the Oklahoma Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children must ensure
compliance with ICWA before allowing the child to be sent to another state for adoption),
70. Transcript of Record, supra note 30, at 10 ("I find that Oklahoma would never have given
consent for the child to be removed from the State of Oklahoma through the Interstate Compact for
Placement of Children, had the Interstate Compact Application been correct."); see also, e.g., In re
Baby Boy L., 103 P.3d 1099 (Okla. 2004) (holding that ICWA applied to an unmarried mother's
attempt to place her child for adoption without the consent of the unmarried Indian father). Brown
did initially file his action seeking custody in the Oklahoma courts, but the court properly dismissed
the action in favor of the South Carolina courts given the pending action there. See Suzette Brewer,
The Fight for Baby Veronica, Part 3, INDIAN CoUNTRY TODAY MEDIA NETWORK (June 4, 2013)
[hereinafter Brewer, The Fight for Baby Veronica, Part 3], http://indiancountrytodaynedianetwork.
com/2013/06/04/fight-baby-veronica-part-3-149704. The adoptive couple filed their motion to
dismiss six months to the day after Veronica had arrived in South Carolina, see Adoptive Couple v.
Baby Girl, 731 S.E.2d 550, 555 (S.C. 2010), rev'd, 133 S. Ct. 2552, invoking the jurisdictional
provisions of both the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act § 201 (a)(1) (1997)
(providing jurisdiction to the state in which the child has resided for six months immediately
preceding the action) and the Uniform Adoption Act § 3-101(a)(1) (1994) (providingjurisdiction to
the state where a child has resided for the six months immediately preceding the action). See also
OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7502-1.1 cmts. (2014) (discussing jurisdiction in adoption cases).
71. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7505-4.1C.1, 7505-4.2D.
72. See Brewer, The Fight for Baby Veronica, Part 1, supra note 45; Email from Chrissi
Nimmo, Assistant Attorney Gen., Cherokee Nation, to Bethany R. Berger, Professor, Univ. of
Conn. Sch. of Law (Mar. 18, 2014) (on file with author).
73. Brewer, The Fight for Baby Veronica, Part 1, supra note 45; see also Adoptive Couple,
731 S.E.2d at 555, rev'd, 133 S. Ct. 2552.
74. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 555.
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thinking that he was agreeing to relinquish his rights to Maldonado, but
immediately realized his mistake.75 He testified that, "I then tried to grab
the paper up. [The process server] told me that I could not grab that [sic]
because... I would be going to jail if I was to do any harm to the paper." 76
Immediately upon returning to Fort Sill, Brown contacted a Judge
Advocate General lawyer on base, and with her assistance retained an
attorney the next day.77 On January 11,2010, Brown filed papers seeking a
stay under the Servicemember's Civil Relief Act, and on January 14 filed a
complaint to establish paternity, custody, and child support of his
daughter.7 8 Brown left for Iraq on January 18, leaving his father with
power of attorney while he was abroad.79 In the meantime, the Cherokee
Nation intervened in the case in April 2010, and court-ordered paternity
testing in May confirmed that Brown was Veronica's father.80
Brown returned from Iraq in December 2010, but the family court did
not hold a hearing on the matter until September 2011.81 On September 29,
2011, Judge Deborah Malphrus issued an order from the bench finding that
ICWA applied to the case, that terminating Brown's parental rights would
not be in Veronica's interests, and that it would be best for all concerned to
quickly transfer Veronica to Brown, on October 15, 201 1.82 The judge
found that even if ICWA did not apply, South Carolina law would prevent
termination because Brown was a "thwarted father" who had tried to
support and care for his child, but who had been prevented from doing so
by the birth mother's deliberate efforts.83 Judge Malphrus declared that
although the "[a]doptive [c]ouple have had this child in their care for two
years, a child is not property, and the right to custody cannot ripen simply
by virtue of the passage of time. Custody and parental rights cannot be
gained by adverse possession. ,84
On November 25, 2011, the judge issued a written opinion reiterating,
in most respects, her earlier order. 85 Although she reversed the finding that
75. Id.
76. Id. (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
77. See id.
78. Id. The complaint was originally filed in Oklahoma, but the Oklahoma courts dismissed
the lawsuit in favor of the case pending in South Carolina. See Brewer, The Fight for Baby
Veronica, Part 3, supra note 70; see also Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 571 n.42 (Kittredge, J.,
dissenting).
79. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 555.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 555 n.l1, 556.
82. Transcript of Record, supra note 30, at 10, 17-19.
83. See id. at 13.
84. Id. at 17.
85. See Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 552.
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Brown was a thwarted father under South Carolina law, 86 Judge Malphrus
wrote that "[t]he undisputed testimony is that he is a loving and devoted
father [to his other daughter]. Even [Mother] herself testified that [Father]
was a good father. There is no evidence to suggest that he would be
anything other than an excellent parent to this child," and "[Father] has
convinced me of his unwavering love for this child., 87 The judge
concluded that "[w]hen parental rights and the best interests of the child
are in conflict, the best interests of the child must prevail. However, in this
case, I find no conflict between the two."8 8
Judge Malphrus also rejected the "existing Indian family" exception, 89
which some courts have used to deny application of ICWA when the
involved family does not have a meaningful connection with an Indian
tribe.90 However, Judge Malphrus also found that, even if the exception
was good law, it would not apply to the facts of this case given Brown and
his family's strong connection to the Cherokee Nation and its culture:
I find [Father] is a Cherokee in more than name only, and
there is, in fact an existing Indian family. There was ample
testimony to support that [Father's] heritage and culture are
very important to him and always had been... [T]here was
evidence in [the home of Father and his family] reflecting
their pride and connection to the [Cherokee] Nation and the
Wolf Clan. I find that [Father] has a strong cultural tie to the
Cherokee Nation.9'
The appellate court granted a temporary stay of execution of the order,
but lifted it on December 30, 201 1.92 The Capobiancos transferred
Veronica to the Browns on December 31, 2011. 9' By this time, the
Capobiancos had retained a local public relations firm, and a phalanx of
reporters was waiting at the scene of the hand off.94
86. See Email from Chrissi Nimmo, Assistant Attorney Gen., Cherokee Nation, to Bethany R.
Berger, Professor, Univ. of Conn. Sch. of Law (Feb. 2, 2014) (on file with author); see also infra
notes 332-38 and accompanying text.
87. Brief in Opposition, supra note 30, at *9 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (first, third, and fourth alteration in original).
88. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 566 (alteration in original) (quoting the family court).
89. Id. at 556.
90. Seeid.at558n.17.
91. Brief in Opposition, supra note 30, at *8-9 (alterations in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
92. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 556.
93. Id at 552.
94. Brewer, The Fight for Baby Veronica, Part 3, supra note 70. The Capobiancos' attorney
changed the location of the hand off from their home to the Omni Hotel at the last minute. Id. Upon
checking out the location and seeing the swarm of cameras, Sharon Jones, one of Brown's
attorneys, refused to conduct the hand off there and told the Capobiancos to meet Brown where he
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Although this Article discusses the details of the legal dispute in the
next Section, the subsequent proceedings are also important to an
understanding of the case's facts. On July 26, 2012, the South Carolina
Supreme Court affirmed Judge Malphrus's family court decision.95 On
June 25, 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed. 96 On July 17, 2013,
without holding a hearing on Veronica's interests, the South Carolina
Supreme Court ordered the adoption finalized and Veronica immediately
transferred to the Capobiancos. 97 In early August, Brown turned himself in
to Oklahoma authorities rather than hand her over. 98 The Oklahoma
authorities stayed extradition pending a hearing, and, in the meantime,
ordered the parties to submit to mediation.99 Finally, after mediation broke
down and the Oklahoma Supreme Court lifted its emergency stay of
execution,' 0 Brown relinquished Veronica to the Capobiancos on
September 23, 2013, eight days after her fourth birthday.'0'
There is no question that the Capobiancos provided a good home for
Veronica. Because there has been no factual hearing since Veronica's
transfer in December 2011, there are no judicial findings regarding her
family life with the Browns (Brown remarried in 2009; Veronica knew his
wife Robin as "Mommy"). 10 2 Newspaper articles suggest that Veronica
thrived with the Browns as well, and was a happy, bubbly child who loved
her parents, enjoyed her pink and purple room and helping tend the ducks,
geese, and horses at her grandparents' farm, was attached to her half-sister,
and gleefully participated in Cherokee stomp dances at weekly classes with
was waiting at her office. Id. Brown and Veronica remained in Jones' office until the reporters gave
up and went away. Id.
95. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 552.
96. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2257 (2013).
97. See Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 746 S.E.2d 346, 347 (S.C. 2013).
98. See Craig Day & Lacie Lowry, Baby Veronica Dad Turns Self in to Oklahoma
Authorities, Resists Extradition, NEWS ON 6 (Aug. 12,2013, 8:33 AM), http://www.newson6.com/
story/23109019/cherokee-court-holds-emergency-hearing-for-baby-veronica; see also Brandi Ball,
Arrest Warrant Issued for Biological Father of Baby Veronica, NEWS ON 6 (Aug. 10, 2013, 1:43
PM), http://www.newson6.com/story/23100247/report-arrest-warrant-issued-for-biological-father-
of-baby-veronica.
99. Email from Chrissi Nimmo, Assistant Attorney Gen., Cherokee Nation, to Bethany R.
Berger, Professor, Univ. of Conn. Sch. of Law (Mar. 18, 2014) (on file with author).
100. See Brown v. DeLapp, 312 P.3d 918, 918 (Okla. 2013).
101. Michael Overall, Baby Veronica Case: Dusten Brown to Stop Custody Fight for
Veronica, TULSA WORLD (Oct. 10, 2013, 5:55 AM), http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/baby-
veronica-case-dusten-brown-to-stop-custody-fight-for/article_2d903520-319a- 11e3-abfl-0019bb
30f3 la.html; see also Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d 550, 552 (S.C. 2012), rev'd, 133 S. Ct. 2552
(2013) (stating that Veronica was born on September 15, 2009).
102. Oklahomanews, Baby Veronica Case aired 7-12-13 (July 15, 2013),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-t4vfBX2oAUw.
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other children." 3 Although some of these reports are from sympathetic fora
like Indian Country Today, others come from the Oklahoma TV News' 0 4
and the Charleston, South Carolina Post and Courier.0 5 All available
evidence suggests that Veronica has had two loving, happy homes and, at
four years old, had to leave the second one and return to the first.
B. The Legal Battle
Indian law cases usually occupy an obscure backwater in the Supreme
Court docket. Justices have described them as "pee wee" and even
"chickenshit" cases.' 0 6 Not so with Adoptive Couple. The Copabiancos
were represented by Lisa Blatt, who has argued more cases before the
Supreme Court than any other woman in private practice and has won all
but one.0 7 Guardian ad Litem Jo Prowell, an aggressive participant in the
litigation, was represented by Paul Clement.'08 Clement is perhaps the
most active Supreme Court litigator in the country; his recent high profile
cases include arguments against the constitutionality of the Affordable
Care Act, the Voting Rights Act, and for the constitutionality of the
Defense of Marriage Act.10 9 Maldonado submitted an amicus brief
authored by Gregory Garre (former U.S. Solicitor General and clerk for
Justice William Rehnquist) and Lori Alvino McGill (former clerk for
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg)." 0 Amicus briefs supporting reversal were
103. See Suzette Brewer, Inseparable Sisters: Adoption Order Exacts Toll on Baby Veronica's
Family, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA NETWORK (July 19, 2013), http://indiancountrytodaymed
ianetwork.com/2013/07/19/inseparable-sisters-adoption-order-exacts-toll-baby-veronicas-family-
150500; Brewer, The Fight for Baby Veronica, Part 1, supra note 45; Andrew Knapp, To
Oklahoma 's American Indian Tribes, Veronica is a Battle Cryfor Cultures, POST& COURIER, (Aug.
17, 2013), http://www.postandcourier.com/article/20130817/PC 16/130819408.
104. E.g., Oklahomanews, supra note 102.
105. See Knapp, supra note 103.
106. BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 57-58, 359 (1979) (quoting
Justices John Marshall Harlan and William J. Brennan).
107. See Vanessa O'Connell, A Chat with Lisa Blatt, a Record-Holding Supreme Court
Litigator, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Jan. 20,2011, 3:22 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/01/20/a-
chat-with-lisa-blatt-a-record-holding-supreme-court-litigator/; Lisa S. Blatt, ARNOLD & PORTER
LLP, http://www.amoldporter.com/professionals.cftn?action=view&id=5409 (last visited Jan. 12,
2015).
108. Response of Guardian Ad Litem ex rel. Baby Girl, in Support of Petition for Writ of
Certiorari at 1, 20, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013) (No. 12-399).
109. David G. Savage, Lawyer Relishes Tough and Unpopular Cases Before Supreme Court,
L.A. TIMES (Dec. 26, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/201 l/dec/26/nation/la-na-court-clement-
20111226.
110. Brief for Birth Mother as Amica Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 14, Adoptive Couple,
133 S. Ct. 2552 (No. 12-399); Gregory G. Garre, U.S. DEPT. JUSTICE,
http://www.justice.gov/osg/bio/gregory-g-garre (last visited Jan. 12, 2015); Lori Alvino McGill,
QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN, LLP, http://www.quinnemanuel.com/attorneys/mcgill-
lori-alvino-.aspx (last visited Jan. 12, 2015).
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also filed by the American Academy of Adoption Attorneys, the National
Council on Adoption, the County Welfare Officers of California, and law
professors Joan Heifetz Hollinger and Elizabeth Bartholet, the latter a
passionate advocate of transracial adoption.
111
Brown was represented by the Yale Law School Supreme Court Clinic,
led by Charles Rothfeld, another star Supreme Court litigator.112 The
United States also weighed in on the respondents' behalf; Deputy Solicitor
General Edwin Kneedler argued the U.S. position. 1 3 The twenty-two
amicus briefs supporting Birth Father and Baby Girl included many from
Indian tribes and organizations as well as one from the ACLU; one from
current and former members of congress (written by Kathleen Sullivan,
former Dean of Stanford Law School and another Supreme Court
superstar);' 1 4 one from the attorneys general of eighteen different states;
one from a number of churches and religious organizations; one from the
Minnesota Department of Human Services; and one from eighteen leading
child welfare organizations (written by Patricia Millett, the woman who
has argued the second most cases before the Supreme Court). 115
This concentration of attorney firepower was not a reflection of the
complexity or conflict below regarding the legal issues in the case. The
case appeared to involve dry questions of statutory construction, and, as
SCOTUSblog opined, the "plain language of the [statute]" appeared to
encompass this situation." 6 The first question was whether Brown was a
"parent" under § 1903(9) of ICWA," 7 which defines the term to mean
111. Brief for the Am. Acad. of Adoption Attorneys as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (No. 12-399); Brief for Nat'l Council for Adoption as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (No. 12-399); Brief for Professor
Joan Heifetz Hollinger and Professor Elizabeth Bartholet, Ctr. for Adoption Policy, and Advokids
as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent Baby Girl and Reversal, Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. 2552
(No. 12-399); Brief of the Cal. State Ass'n of Counties and the Cnty. Welfare Dirs. Ass'n of Cal. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (No. 12-399).
112. Tony Mauro, Brief of the Week: Star Advocates Face Off in High-Profile Adoption Case,
NAT'L L.J. (Dec. 4, 2012), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202580249740? (LexisNexis
subscription required).
113. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance, Adoptive
Couple, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (No. 12-399); Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, OYEZ PROJECT,
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/2012 12_399 (last visited Jan. 12, 2015).
114. Kathleen M Sullivan, QuINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN, LLP,
http://www.quinnemanuel.com/attorneys/sullivan-kathleen-m.aspx (last visited Jan. 12, 2015).
115. O'Connell, supra note 107. For a helpful compilation of briefs, see Matthew L.M.
Fletcher, Turtle Talk Guide to the Amici Supporting Respondents in Baby Veronica Case (Adoptive
Couple v. Baby Girl), TURTLE TALK (Mar. 29, 2013), http://turtletalk.wordpress.com/2013/03/29/
turtle-talk-guide-to-the-amici-supporting-respondents-in-baby-veronica-case-adoptive-couple-v-
baby-girl/.
116. Amy Howe, Argument Preview: Court to Take on Law and Emotion in Indian Adoption
Case, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 13, 2013, 8:40 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=162343.
117. Id.; see also Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2559-60.
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"any biological parent... of an Indian child," but excludes "the unwed
father where paternity has not been acknowledged or established."'"18
Although most courts apply state law standards to determine whether
paternity has been acknowledged or established, all would consider the
steps Brown took-filing an assertion of paternity and having it judicially
established via DNA testing-to be sufficient. 19 Yet the Supreme Court
did not even resolve this question, assuming without deciding that Brown
was a parent under ICWA.120
The second question was whether the standards ICWA establishes for
involuntary termination of parental rights applied to a father who had not
had custody of his child.' 2 1 Section 1912 as a whole governs involuntary
child welfare proceedings in state court. 22 Whereas, § 1913, in contrast,
governs voluntary consent to foster care and termination of parental
rights. 123 Section 1912(a) requires notice to a child's parent and tribe at
least ten days before any involuntary foster care placement or termination
of parental rights.124 Section 1912(b) provides for court-ordered counsel
for any indigent parent in any "removal, placement, or termination
proceeding," while § 1912(c) provides all parties with the right to examine
all records in the case. 125 Section 1912(d) provides that the party seeking
foster care placement or termination of parental rights must show that
active remedial efforts had been made "to prevent the breakup of the Indian
family."' 126 Section 1912(e) provides that foster care placement may not be
ordered absent "clear and convincing evidence... that the continued
custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in
serious emotional or physical damage to the child," while § 1912(f)
provides that termination of parental rights may not be ordered absent
evidence "beyond a reasonable doubt" of such harm.127
The South Carolina Supreme Court found that because the adoptive
couple had not established serious harm to Veronica from her father's
custody or that efforts had been made to prevent family breakup as
118. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(9) (2012).
119. See Bruce L. v. W.E., 247 P.3d 966, 978-79 (Alaska 2011) (summarizing cases from
various states that demonstrate the sufficiency of affirmative steps to acknowledge paternity); see
also Brief of the States, supra note 25, at 16-22 (discussing case law and arguing that Brown
satisfied standards established by state courts).
120. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2560.
121. See Howe, supra note 116; see also Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2560-62.
122. 25 U.S.C. § 1912.
123. Id. § 913.
124. Id. 1912(a).
125. Id. § 1912(b)-(c).
126. Id. § 1912(d).
127. Id. § 1912(e)-(f).
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required by § § 1912(d) and (f), parental rights could not be terminated. 128
Petitioners argued, however, that even if Brown was a parent, and was thus
required to receive notice and court-appointed counsel in a termination of
parental rights proceeding under § 1912, none of the standards § 1912
requires for involuntary termination applied because he did not presently
have custody of Veronica. 129 Rather, only state law standards applied, and
in South Carolina, unwed fathers, like Brown, had no defenses at all
against termination of their parental rights. 3 ° This proposition makes no
sense in light of the rest of § 1912-would Congress really require
numerous procedural protections for parents facing involuntary termination
of parental rights only to permit the termination to proceed without any
substantive defense? And yet this is the conclusion that five members of
the Supreme Court reached.'
Starting with the words "continued custody" in § 1912(f), the Court
determined that they included only custody by someone who already had
legal or physical custody. 132 This certainly is one meaning of the term. As
Justice Antonin Scalia pointed out in his dissent, however, "continued
custody" could also refer to custody that was "not merely that initial or
temporary custody" but protracted or without interruption in the future. 133
Scalia's interpretation is also far more consistent with the structure of
§ 1912 as a whole, which deals generally with involuntary terminations,
and gives significant rights in such proceedings to unmarried fathers who
have acknowledged paternity. 134
The Court then defined custody to mean physical or legal custody as
defined by state law. 135 Because mothers have legal custody of illegitimate
children in the absence of a contrary court order, the substantive
requirements of § 1912(f) did not apply. 136 This was actually a far more
radical proposition than argued by Petitioners, who only asserted that
Brown lacked legal rights because he had not provided the financial
support necessary under South Carolina law to provide unmarried fathers
128. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 731 S.E.2d 550, 562-64 (S.C. 2012), rev'd, 133 S. Ct.
2552 (2013).
129. Reply Brief for Petitioners at 7-8, Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (No. 12-399).
130. See id.
131. See Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2556-57.
132. Id. at 2560.
133. Id. at 2571-72 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2577 n.6 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
(agreeing with Scalia's proposition).
134. See id. at 2573 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (arguing that interpreting § 1912 through two
words at the end of the statute is a "textually backward reading" that "misapprehends ICWA's
structure and scope").
135. See id. at 2562 (majority opinion).
136. Id.
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with the right to contest termination of parental rights in adoptions. 137 State
laws differ on when unwed fathers have such rights, with a number of
states according greater rights than South Carolina.
138
Virtually all state statutes, however, provide that unmarried mothers
have legal custody of their children until otherwise established. 139 Because
at least 67% of Indian children are born to unmarried parents, 140 this would
prevent most fathers who do not live with their children from seeking
custody under § 1912(f).141
But the Court's holding could be given a less sweeping interpretation.
In places, the Court claimed that its ruling was limited to a "parent who
abandoned his or her child prior to birth and never had physical or legal
custody."' 42 Further, Justice Stephen Breyer stated in concurrence that the
Court was not deciding the case of a "father with visitation rights or a
father who has paid 'all of his child support obligations,' [or] special
circumstances such as a father who was deceived about the existence of the
child or a father who was prevented from supporting his child.' ' 143 Later
courts may find that Adoptive Couple does not apply to parents who at
some time had significant contact with or responsibility for their children.
The legal rule announced by the majority, however, does not clearly
exclude such cases-such fathers do not have "legal or physical custody"
under state law, 144 and therefore would not appear to have any rights under
the standards applied in the case.
The Court also held that fathers like Brown are not entitled to any
protections under § 1912(d), which requires that "active efforts" be made
to prevent the breakup of the Indian family before termination or foster
care placement.145 That this provision was "adjacent" to § 1912(e) and (f),
the Court stated, "strongly suggests that the phrase 'breakup of the Indian
family' should be read in harmony with the 'continued custody'
137. Brief for Petitioners, Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (No. 12-399), 2013 WL 633597,
at *25-26.
138. See Bruce L. v. W.E., 247 P.3d 966,978-79 (Alaska 2011) (summarizing case law from
several states on the issue of establishing paternity).
139. See 1 DONALD T. KRAMER, LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN § 7:10, at 598 (rev. 2d ed. 2005).
140. See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Births: Final Datafor 2012,62 NAT'L VITAL
STATISTICS REPS. 9 tbl.13 (Dec. 30, 2013), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr62/nvsr62
_09.pdf. This report undercounts as it tracks nonmarital births by the race of the mother, not the
father, and thus misses cases in which the father, but not the mother, was American Indian.
141. See Brief of Wis. Tribes, supra note 65, at 20-21 (noting that 95% of all voluntary
relinquishments are by unmarried mothers).
142. See Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2563 n.8.
i43. Id. at 2571 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2578 & n.8
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting)).
144. See id. at 2562 (majority opinion).
145. Id. at 2557; see also 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) (2012).
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requirement., 146 It is not clear why a restrictive reading of language after
the language construed "strongly suggests" that the restriction should be
used to narrow earlier parts of the statute. The Court found, however, that
because Brown did not have legal or physical custody, there was no family
breakup in terminating Veronica's legal relationship to him.
14 7
In summary, although the Court assumed that Brown was a parent
under ICWA, and left untouched the requirements that such parents have
rights to notice, counsel, intervention, and examination of all records in
any involuntary termination proceedings, it rendered those rights
essentially meaningless. While state law might require some kind of
substantive showing before parental rights could be terminated, the
substantive standards in ICWA simply did not apply.
A few state courts in the 1980s limited-ICWA's application in cases
involving unmarried Indian fathers, but these cases were based primarily
on those courts' interpretation of the overall purposes of the statute, rather
than construction of the actual words of the statute. In the first of these
cases, In re Adoption of Baby Boy L.,148 the Kansas Supreme Court held
that ICWA did not apply at all in a case where the father never had custody
of his child, because there was no "existing Indian family" to break Up. 149
But courts and legislatures have since generally rejected this "existing
Indian family exception," even in several of the states that originally
adopted it.15
0
146. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2563.
147. Id. at 2562. It is true that the South Carolina Supreme Court was somewhat confused
about when the "active efforts" requirement would apply, suggesting that for a father who was not
interested in having a relationship with his child this would mandate measures "attempting to
stimulate [Biological] Father's desire to be a parent." Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 731 S.E.2d
550,562 (S.C. 2012), rev'd, 133 S. Ct. 2552. The majority understandably had some fun with such
a requirement. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2563-64 & n.9. But if§ 1912 is correctly read only to
apply to involuntary terminations of parental rights, no such "active efforts" would be required for
fathers not interested in parenting their children.
148. 643 P.2d 168 (Kan. 1982), overruled by In re A.J.S., 204 P.3d 543 (Kan. 2009).
149. See id. at 175-76; accord In re S.A.M., 703 S.W.2d 603, 608 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986)
(refusing to apply § 1912(d) and (f) to a case both because the unmarried father did not qualify as a
parent and because there was no "Indian family" to preserve). In re S.A.M did state briefly that the
child in that case was not in the appellant's "continued" custody, but did not rest its opinion on this
holding. Id. at 607; see also In re Adoption of Baby Boy D, 742 P.2d 1059, 1063-64 (Okla. 1985)
(holding noncustodial unmarried father did not have standing to object to adoption or invoke
protections of § § 1911, 1912, and 1913 because the child had not been part of an "existing Indian
environment"), overruled by In re Baby Boy L., 103 P.3d 1099 (Okla. 2004).
150. See ROBERT ANDERSON, BETHANY R. BERGER, PHILIP P. FRICKEY & SARAH KRAKOFF,
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: CASES AND COMMENTARY 512 (2010) (listing six states and one appellate
division in California that follow the "existing Indian family" doctrine and fifteen states and one
appellate division in New York that reject it).
FLORIDA LA WREVIEW
Like those early state court decisions, in Adoptive Couple the U.S.
Supreme Court rested its opinion, in part, on its finding that ICWA "was
primarily intended to stem the unwarranted removal of Indian children
from intact Indian families." '' State courts were forced to acknowledge
that Congress had other important goals in ICWA, 52 particularly after
1989, when the Supreme Court decided Mississippi Choctaw v.
Holyfield,153 its sole previous case on the act, strongly affirming ICWA's
application to twins voluntarily relinquished for adoption at birth.154
Although the Court in Adoptive Couple declined Petitioners' invitation to
adopt the existing Indian family exception, 155 by echoing the pre-Holyfield
narrow interpretation of congressional purpose and providing a way to
evade application of ICWA through construction of its statutory language,
the decision may breathe new life into the generally rejected doctrine.
With little discussion, the Supreme Court also eviscerated the
substantive standard that applies to both voluntary and involuntary
placements under ICWA. Section 1915(a) provides that:
In any adoptive placement of an Indian child under State
law, a preference shall be given, in the absence of good cause
to the contrary, to a placement with (1) a member of the
child's extended family; (2) other members of the Indian
child's tribe; or (3) other Indian families. 56
Some courts have found that factors such as birth-parent preference and
long placement with a prospective family might contribute to "good cause"
to deviate from the placement preferences. 157 The Supreme Court,
151. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2561.
152. See 25 U.S.C. § 1901(2)-(5), 1902 (2012) (referring to congressional "responsibility for
the protection and preservation of Indian tribes," the fact that "there is no resource that is more vital
to the continued existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their children," the placement of
children in "non-Indian foster and adoptive homes," and policies to "promote the stability and
security of Indian tribes and families").
153. 490 U.S. 30 (1989).
154. Id. at 53.
155. See Marcia A. Zug, The Real Impact of Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl: The Existing
Indian Family Doctrine Is Not Affirmed, but the Future of the ICWA 's Placement Preferences Is
Jeopardized, 42 CAP. U. L. REV. 327, 339 (2013).
156. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a), declared unconstitutional as applied by In re Santos Y., 92 Cal.
App. 4th 1274, 1312 (Ct. App. 2001).
157. See, e.g., id. § 1915(c) (providing that parental preference could be considered in
appropriate circumstances); In re Adoption of F.H., 851 P.2d 1361, 1364 (Alaska 1993)
(concluding that mother's preference for placement with non-Indian adoptive parents was an
appropriate factor in finding good cause); In re Appeal in Maricopa Cnty. Juvenile Action No. A-
25525, 667 P.2d 228, 234 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983) (finding good cause where child had resided with
adoptive mother for three years). But see In re T.S.W., 276 P.3d 133, 145 (Kan. 2012) (concluding
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however, held that the placement preferences were completely
"inapplicable in cases where no alternative party has formally sought to
adopt the child. This is because there simply is no 'preference' to apply if
no alternative party that is eligible to be preferred under § 1915(a) has
come forward.' '
58
If taken at face value, this holding completely undermines the statutory
requirement; henceforward, to evade compliance with the preferences one
only need keep the proposed placement for adoption secret until a family
has filed to adopt the child. Because there would be "no alternative party"
at that moment, the placement preferences would not apply. Before
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, no one assumed that Congress intended the
statute to be so easily evaded. Indeed, the guidelines promulgated by the
Bureau of Indian Affairs suggested the contrary, stating that one of the
factors in determining good cause was "[t]he unavailability of suitable
families for placement after a diligent search has been completed for
families meeting the preference criteria."159 State statutes, 6 ° judicial
decisions,' 6' and federal guidelines' 62 all agree that § 1915 requires, at a
minimum, reasonable efforts to find a suitable family meeting the
preferences.
It might be possible to avoid this result by reading the majority opinion
to permit application of the placement preferences in situations in which
individuals outside the preferences initially file for adoption, but a family
within the preferences files before the adoption is finalized.1 63 The court
would then determine whether the second family was suitable for the child,
and whether good cause existed to finalize adoption with the first family
instead. Justice Breyer suggested this in his concurrence, asking whether
parental preference alone cannot constitute good cause); In re Custody of S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d 357,
364 (Minn. 1994) (holding it improper to find that long placement alone constituted good cause).
158. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2564 (2013).
159. Guidelines for State Courts; Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed. Reg. 67,584,
67,594 (Nov. 26, 1979).
160. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.31 (k) (West 2014) (requiring documentation of
efforts to find placement complying with the preferences); IOWA CODE § 232B.9(8) (2014)
(requiring documentation of "active efforts" to comply with the preferences), declared
unconstitutional by In re N.N.E., 752 N.W.2d 1 (2008); WIS. STAT. § 48.028(7)(e) (2014)
(determining the existence of good cause to depart from placement preference based on
considerations of whether a preferential placement is unavailable only after diligent efforts have
been made).
161. See, e.g., In re Welfare of S.N.R., 617 N.W.2d 77, 84-85 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000)
(rejecting application to deviate from placement preferences where, among other things, there was
no showing of unavailability of homes after diligent search).
162. Guidelines for State Courts; Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed. Reg. at 67,594-
95.
163. See Zug, supra note 155, at 349-50 (arguing that this is the correct reading ofAdoptive
Couple)
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§ 1915 could "allow an absentee father to reenter the special statutory order
of preference with support from the tribe, and subject to a court's
consideration of 'good cause?' I raise, but do not here try to answer, the
question."'64
On remand, however, the South Carolina Supreme Court rejected this
alternative interpretation, although both Brown and his parents had by then
filed adoption petitions in the Oklahoma and Cherokee courts. The court
held:
[A]t the time Adoptive Couple sought to institute adoption
proceedings, they were the only party interested in adopting
her. Because no other party has sought adoptive placement in
this action, § 1915 has no application in concluding this
matter, nor may that section be invoked at the midnight hour
to further delay the resolution of this case. We find the clear
import of the Supreme Court's majority opinion to foreclose
successive § 1915 petitions, for litigation must have finality,
and it is the role of this court to ensure "the sanctity of the
adoption process" under state law is "jealously guarded."1 65
Although the language refers to "the time the Adoptive Couple sought
to institute adoption proceedings," one might read the decision to be based
on the fact that the petitions to adopt came years after the litigation began.
This condemnation of the "midnight hour" petition seems bizarrely
punitive, considering it was used to bar a biological father who since the
moment he was provided with notice of the proposed adoption has sought
custody of his child, and which every court had held he had a right to until
a couple of months earlier.
Why did the Court thus do violence to ICWA's statutory text and
purpose? Justice Clarence Thomas's concurrence states that both Petitioner
and Respondent "put forward a plausible interpretation of the relevant
sections of the Indian Child Welfare Act," but he joined with the majority
opinion because it better accorded with his belief that an originalist reading
of the Indian Commerce Clause should end federal Indian law as we know
it. 166 Without elaboration, the majority opinion referred vaguely to
potential "equal protection concerns,"167 but when examined, these
164. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2571 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring)
165. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 746 S.E.2d 51, 53 (S.C. 2013) (quoting Gardner v. Baby
Edward, 342 S.E.2d 601, 603 (S.C. 1986)).
166. See Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2565-71 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that the
Indian Commerce Clause does not support ICWA, or indeed any congressional action not having to
do with commerce and trade). For a powerful argument that Justice Thomas was wrong in his
assertion that the original understanding of constitutional federal Indian power was limited to trade,
see Gregory Ablavsky, Beyond the Indian Commerce Clause, 124 YALE L.J. 1012, 1028-32 (2015).
167. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2565.
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concerns are legally evanescent. For the four Justices beside Thomas, this
Article argues, the opinion cannot be justified on statutory or constitutional
foundations, but only on ill-founded policy beliefs. Prodded a little, these
beliefs reveal divisions as to race, gender, and class, and misunderstanding
of the roles they played in the case and in Indian adoptions in general.
II. THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD?
The obvious response to the arguments in this Article is that Adoptive
Couple was decided based on the best interests of a child, not her or her
parents' race, or gender, or anything else. This claim has two parts: first,
that ICWA undermined Veronica's best interests; second, that holding
ICWA applies to cases like this would harm Indian children in general.
Both claims, however, fall apart on further examination.
Regarding the first part of the claim, after a four-day hearing with
numerous witnesses and two experts, the family court specifically found
that placing Veronica with her birth father was in Veronica's interests. 168
The evidence was "undisputed" that Brown was an "excellent parent" and
would love and care for Veronica. 69 Judge Malphrus wrote that "' [w]hen
parental rights and the best interests of the child are in conflict, the best
interests of the child must prevail,"' but "'in this case, I find no conflict
between the two."' 170 The family court and South Carolina Supreme Court
also found-consistent with psychological literature-that the healthy
attachment Veronica presumably had to the Capobiancos would likely
enable her to bond to Brown and his family without lasting harm. 17t All
reports suggest that these courts were correct and that Veronica thrived
with her birth father and his wife.1 72 The claim that the decision to reverse
the family court was about Veronica's interests is further belied by the
2013 decision to remove Veronica after two years with her father without
even a factual hearing as to her best interests.
There is also no evidence that ICWA has harmed Indian children by
interfering with warranted adoptions or their permanency. Although Justice
Samuel Alito wrote forebodingly that Respondent's interpretation of
ICWA "would put certain vulnerable children at a great disadvantage"
because "many prospective adoptive parents would surely pause before
adopting any child who might possibly qualify as an Indian under the
ICWA,"'173 this assertion is simply implausible given the great demand for
168. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 731 S.E.2d 550, 552, 563,565-66 (S.C. 2012), rev'd, 133
S. Ct. 2552.
169. Brief in Opposition, supra note 30, at *9-10.
170. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 566 (alteration in original) (quoting family court).
171. See id. at 563.
172. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
173. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2565.
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healthy adoptable babies. Since the 1920s, a continuous "baby famine" has
led to repeated scandals regarding black-market and illegal adoptions. 174
Decreasing stigma attached to single motherhood; far greater employment,
childcare, and welfare options for women; and greater availability of birth
control and abortion have radically reduced the supply of adoptable infants
since the 1970s. 17 5 Before 1973, 8.7% of infants born to all single mothers
and 19.3% of those born to white single mothers were relinquished for
adoption at birth;' 76 by 2002, however, only 1% of infants born to all single
mothers, and only 1.3% of those born to white single mothers were
relinquished at birth. 177 In this same period, the percentage of births to
unmarried mothers has not even doubled. 178
While the supply of adoptable infants is just a small fraction of what it
was in the 1970s, the demand for adoption has not similarly declined. One
estimate is that there are about six families seeking to adopt for every
completed adoption.' 79 Although the excess demand for adoptable babies
led adopters to look overseas for children, the supply there is also
dwindling, partly as a result of the United States' 2008 accession to the
1993 Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Cooperation in
Respect of Intercountry Adoption. 80 The reduction is also due to efforts by
174. LAURA BRIGGS, SOMEBODY'S CHILDREN: THE POLITICS OF TRANSRACIAL AND
TRANSNATIONAL ADOPTION 6-7 (2012).
175. See id. at 7; see also EVAN B. DONALDSON ADOPTION INSTITUTE, SAFEGUARDING THE
RIGHTS AND WELL-BEING OF BIRTHPARENTS IN THE ADOPTION PROCESS 7 (rev. 2007). Although the
increase in age-related infertility may be thought to be a potential cause of the increased demand for
adoption, it is not clear that there is a net increase in infertile couples given the dramatic advances
in fertility treatment. What is clear, as discussed infra Section V.C, is that today infertility is not
simply a biological issue, but a class issue, as upper-middle-class women are far more likely to defer
childbearing for education or work.
176. ANJANI CHANDRA ET AL., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, ADOPTION,
ADOPTION SEEKING, AND RELINQUISHMENT FOR ADOPTION IN THE UNITED STATES 9 tbl.5 (1999).
177. Jo JONES, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, WHO ADOPTS? CHARACTERISTICS
OF WOMEN AND MEN WHO HAVE ADOPTED CHILDREN 5 fig.6 (2009); cf MADELYN FREUNDLICH,
ADOPTION AND ETimcS: THE MARKET FORCES IN ADOPTION 8-9 (2000) (noting that only about 1% of
babies born to unmarried mothers were placed for adoption from 1989-1995).
178. See JOYCE A. MARTIN ET AL., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL& PREVENTION, BIRTHS: FINAL
DATA FOR 2012, at tbl. 16 (2013) (noting the percentage of births to unmarried women was 26.4% in
1970, 43.6% in 2002, and 45.3% in 2012).
179. Jo JONES, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, ADOPTION EXPERIENCES OF
WOMEN AND MEN AND DEMAND FOR CHILDREN TO ADOPT BY WOMEN 18-44 YEARS OF AGE IN THE
UNITED STATES, 2002, at 4, 19 tbl. 1 (2008); FREUNDLICH, supra note 177, at 8-9 ("The data suggest
a ratio of approximately six adoption seekers for every actual adoption.").
180. See Chiaki Moriguchi, The Evolution of ChildAdoption in the United States, 1950-2010:
An Economic Analysis of Historical Trends 8-9 (Inst. of Econ. Research, Hitotsubashi Univ.
Discussion Paper Series A, Paper No. 572, 2012), http://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/rs/bitstream/
10086/23103/1/DP572.pdf. See generally Convention on Protection of Children and Cooperation
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important sending countries such as South Korea,"8 ' Liberia,182 Russia,
China,183 and Guatemala,' 84 to limit or shut down adoptions in the face of
allegations of corruption and baby trafficking.
Related to the argument that ICWA would keep adoptive children from
finding homes was the argument that ICWA represents a legally sanctioned
form of "race matching," which denies needy children adoptions by
willing parents solely because they are not the same race.' 85 While race
matching was once both the law and practice of adoption,' 86 it endures
in Respect of Intercountry Adoption, HCCH (May 29, 1993), http://www.hcch.net/upload/
conventions/txt33en.pdf.
181. See Intercountry Adoption Notice, Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. Dept. of State, Korea
Begins Implementing Special Adoption Act (Jan. 25, 2013), available at
http://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/alerts-and-notices/south-
korea- 1.html (providing notice of a South Korean law prioritizing domestic adoptions and requiring
family court approval of all inter-country adoptions).
182. KATHRYN JOYCE, THE CHILD CATCHERS: RESCUE, TRAFFICKING, AND THE NEW GOSPEL OF
ADOPTION, at x (2013) (noting that Liberia shut down international adoption after numerous
complaints about unethical adoption practices, including allegations of child trafficking).
183. Kevin Voigt & Sophie Brown, International adoptions in decline as number of orphans
grows, CNN (Sept. 17, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/16/world/international-adoption-main-
story-decline/.
184. Moriguchi, supra note 180, at 16; Rachel L. Swarns, A Family, for a Few Days a Year,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/09/world/americas/stalled-adoption-
program-in-guatemala-leaves-families-in-limbo.html (discussing effect of Guatemalan shut down of
adoptions, as well as U.S. restrictions on adoptions from countries like Vietnam and Cambodia).
185. RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES: SEX, MARRIAGE, IDENTITY, AND ADOPT1ON
480, 518 (2003) (calling ICWA "the last stand of open race matching in America," and arguing that
it "decrease[s] the likelihood that needy children will find adoptive homes, popularize[s] hurtful
superstitions, and reinforce[s] claims that unfairly stigmatize substantial numbers of non-Indian
adoptive parents"). A frequent claim is that this movement is necessary to combat the ill effects of
similarly condoned race matching, such as the 1974 statement by the National Association of Black
Social Workers against placement of African American children in White homes. BRIGGS, supra
note 174, at 56-57. This argument overlooks the lack of evidence of any effect of the statement. See
id. at 57. The highpoint of the first wave of transracial adoptions was in 1970, at 1743 adoptions.
Id. By the time the Association issued its statement four years later, the number had already dropped
to 591. Id.
186. See Mary Eschelbach Hansen & Daniel Pollack, TransracialAdoption of Black Children:
An Economic Analysis, in BABY MARKETS: MONEY AND THE NEW POLITICS OF CREATING FAMILIES
133, 134 (Michele Bratcher Goodwin ed., 2010). The Interethnic Placement Provisions, amending
the Multi-Ethnic Placement Act, prohibited race matching in public adoptions in 1996. See
Interethnic Placement Provisions, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1808(c)(1), 110 Stat. 1903 (1996)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1996b(l) (2012)); see also Joan Heifetz Hollinger, ABA Ctr. on Children
& the Law, A Guide to the Multiethnic Placement Act of 1994, AM. BAR ASS'N 1,
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dani/aba/administrative/child law/GuidetoMutiethnicPlace
mentAct.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Jan. 12, 2015). Since then, there have been two cases in
which public agencies were found to block white families from adopting black children
(interestingly, one was in South Carolina), and some other cases in which public agencies were
asked to change procedures. See Hansen & Pollack, supra, at 142-43.
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today as a function of private adopters and the market. 8 7 Seeking to cater
to the preferences of private adopters, agency websites advertise racial
segmentation, charging thousands less for less racially desirable babies.188
In this blatantly racially segmented market, however, the children that
suffer are those of African American descent; Latino, Asian, and American
Indian children are generally classified with the vanishingly small supply
of white infants.' 89 A recent empirical analysis of applications to adopt
available infants, for example, found that parents are seven times less
likely to seek African American infants, but there were no differences
between rates of application for White and Hispanic babies.' 90
In short, the demand for babies like Veronica is such that procedural
hurdles will not deter prospective adoptive families. As evidence of this,
ICWA was enacted in 1978;'191 since then, multiple high-profile cases have
overturned adoptive placements that failed to comply with its mandates. 192
Yet the demand for babies is great enough that individuals like the
Capobiancos wait for months if not years and spend upwards of $40,000 to
adopt children with Indian heritage and pay little attention to the potential
implications of the law.' 93
But what about children involuntarily removed from their families?
Won't ICWA's procedural protections and placement preferences prevent
necessary terminations of parental rights and decrease the likelihood of
Indian children finding permanent placements? In 2005, the Government
Accountability Office evaluated this concern and determined it was
187. See, e.g., PAMELA ANN QuiRoz, ADOPTION IN A COLOR-BLIND SOCIETY 50 (2007) ("By
law race cannot be factored into placement; yet in private adoption children are categorized,
labeled, described, and priced along racial lines. The obviously race-conscious practice of private
agencies contradicts this color-blind policy, and on websites of private agencies, private identifiers
such as race become public code.... Apparently, race matching and race consciousness are only
allowed in the 'free' market of adoption.").
188. See id. at 68-70, 77.
189. Id. at 72-73, 76.
190. Baccara et al., supra note 20, at abstract, 3. Girls, like Veronica, are also generally
preferred over boys. See id. at 23.
191. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, NAT'L INDIAN WELFARE ASS'N,
http://www.nicwa.org/indianchildwelfare-act/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2015).
192. See, e.g., Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 53-54 (1989)
(invalidating a three-year placement of twins made in violation of ICWA); In re Adoption of
Halloway, 732 P.2d 962, 963-65, 970 (Utah 1986) (invalidating a five-year placement of a boy
made in violation of ICWA).
193. Melanie Duncan initially estimated in her testimony that they had spent $30,000 to
$40,000 for the adoption before the litigation arose but later said that those figures were probably
too low. Testimony of Adoptive Mother, supra note 53, at 198-99. She also testified that she was
aware in entering the process that Veronica had Cherokee heritage, and knew that it might create
risks, but considered this just one of the risks present in all adoptions. Id. at 181, 215-16.
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unfounded. 94 Children subject to ICWA did not remain without permanent
placements longer or experience more changes in placements than other
children in foster care.' 9
5
Indeed, even the idea that adoption is a significant option for such
children is inconsistent with the realities of foster care. Fifteen years after
the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 put financial pressure on
states to terminate parental rights and place more children for adoption,' 96
about 20% of foster children, and only about 50% of children placed in
foster homes with the intent that they be adopted, actually exit foster care
via adoption.197 Foster children are older and less desirable adoptees than
children relinquished at birth, and all but 15% of the adopters of such
children had been their foster parents prior to adoption. 19 8 Additionally, as
many as 25% of the adopters, accounting for much of the increase in
adoptions from foster care since 1997, were related to the child.' 99
Given the importance of adoption by relatives for children in foster
care, involving fathers and their families may actually increase the
possibilities for permanent placement.2 °° Similarly, ICWA may also
increase potential permanent placements by enlisting tribes in recruiting
foster and adoptive families for children, particularly the kind of hard-to-
place older children that are more likely to be in foster care.20 '
The child welfare organizations' amicus brief underscored the
consistency between children's interests, ICWA, and its application in
cases like Adoptive Child.20 2 Eighteen of the leading child welfare
organizations in the country joined the brief.20 3 They included Casey
Family Programs, the largest foundation focused on foster care and the
child welfare system; the Child Welfare League of America, whose
194. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-290, INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT:
EXISTING INFORMATION ON IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES COULD BE USED TO TARGET GUIDANCE AND
ASSISTANCE TO STATES 4 (Apr. 2005), http://www.gao.gov/assets/250/245936.pdf.
195. See id.
196. See Frontline, Overview: The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, PBS,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/fostercare/inside/asfa.html (last visited Jan. 12,
2015).
197. CHILDREN'S BUREAU, TRENDS IN FOSTER CARE AND ADOPTION (FFY 2002-FFY 2012),
ADMIN. FOR CHILD. YOUTH & FAMILIES, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. 3 (2013),
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/trends-fostercare-adoption20l2.pdf.
198. See Moriguchi, supra note 180, at 18-19, tbl 4.
199. Id. at 19.
200. Cf Brief of Casey Family Programs et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent Birth
Father at 2-3, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013) (No. 12-399).
201. For example, in Adoptive Couple, the Cherokee Nation had identified several approved
Cherokee families who would be interested in adopting Baby Girl if her family did not want
custody. Brief for the Cherokee Nation at 21-22, Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (No. 12-399).
202. Brief of Casey Family Programs et al., supra note 200, at 2-3.
203. ld. at 1-2.
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members include five hundred public and private child welfare
organizations from across the country; the North American Council on
Adoptable Children, founded by adoptive families to meet the needs of
children waiting for permanent families and those seeking to adopt them;
Voice for Adoption, which advocates for improved adoption policies and
supports adoptive families; the Foster Care Alumni of America, a national
organization of alumni of the foster care system; FosterClub, a national
network of children and teens in foster care; and the National Association
of Social Workers, which represents 140,000 social workers from all fifty
states.2°
The amici agreed that "legitimate, regularized adoptions are an
extremely important part of the child welfare system.' ' 20 5 Nevertheless,
they were also "unanimous that it is a best practice to preserve a child's
ties with her fit, willing birth parents even if those ties are initially
undeveloped due to separation of the child from the parents shortly after
birth, as may happen with an adoption placement made at birth, "206 calling
this a "bedrock principle of child welfare., 20 7 In particular, the
organizations argued that fully involving birth fathers regardless of
whether they had been previously involved with the child was important
both to ensure stable permanent placements and to allow children to build
relationships important for their well-being.20 8
The organizations were also vehement in their insistence that ties
formed in placements before legal approval should not be used to justify
termination of parental rights. "It would turn child welfare best practices
upside down," they opined, "if temporary foster care or contested non-final
adoptive placements, however erroneous, could justify courts' disregard of
governing legislative rules providing substantive and procedural safeguards
for preserving a child's ties to her fit and willing birth parents." 20 9 They
called the "acknowledged heartbreak" of the removal of Veronica from the
Capobiancos "a case in point" and "the consequence of the petitioners'
adoption agency's circumvention of governing Oklahoma and federal law
and the failure to adhere to best practices which amici have long
advocated-not an improper delay in the biological father's expression of
his interest. 2 10
204. Id. apps. I a, 3a, 7a, 9a; Become a Member, CWLA, http://www.cwla.org/membership/
(last visited Jan. 12, 2015).
205. Brief of Casey Family Programs et al., supra note 200, at 27.
206. Id. at 9-10.
207. Id. at 3.
208. See id. at 8-10.
209. Id. at 18.
210. Id. at 19.
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The amicus brief submitted by eighteen states, including California,
New York, and most of the states with the highest Indian populations in the
United States, agreed that according full rights to birth fathers under ICWA
supported the interests of children and stable adoption.2 1 1 Because states
have different standards regarding the rights of unmarried birth fathers in
adoption,212 whether an adoption without paternal consent was legal might
depend on which state's law applied. Which state's law applied, in turn,
could depend on the residence of the mother, father, or adoptive parent, the
child's place of birth and current residence, and where the adoption dispute
was filed. This variation could lead to confusion, disruptive challenges to
placement, and "an adoption brokerage business" to game which state's
law would apply.21 3 It would also undermine states' interests "in ensuring
that their children's and adoptive parents' rights are protected regardless of
where a child is born, where the father resides, or where the adoption
ultimately takes place." 21
4
In conclusion, the organizations most deeply concerned and involved
with the rights of children in foster care and adoption-the largest child
welfare organizations dedicated to their needs and the states empowered to
protect them-agreed that both in Veronica's case and in general, ICWA's
protections served the best interests of children. The Court based its
suggestion that they did not-that indeed, they raised equal protection
concerns 2 -- on untested intuitions rather than fact or expert opinion. The
next Part shows how these intuitions emerged from distinctions of race,
gender, and class that are damaging to fathers, mothers, and ultimately to
children as well.
III. 3/256THs: DISTORTIONS OF RACE IN THE NAME OF EQUALITY
Paul Clement's21 6 mantra in arguing Adoptive Couple was that ICWA
only applied because Veronica had "3/256ths of Cherokee blood."
Unfortunately for Brown, this became the mantra of the Supreme Court
majority as well. This assertion was false on several levels and reveals the
distorted way in which assertions of racial egalitarianism are used to justify
colonial domination of Native peoples.
211. Brief of the States, supra note 25, at 4, 25; see also TINA NORRIS, PAULA L. VINES &
ELIZABETH M. HOEFFEL, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 6 (2012), https://www.census.gov/prod/"cen2010/
briefs/c2010br-l 0.pdf.
212. See Brief of the States, supra note 25, at 23-25; see also generally The Rights of
Unmarried Fathers, CHILDREN'S BUREAU, (Jan. 2014), https://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide
lawspolicies/statutes/putative.pdf (summarizing and reprinting varied state laws).
213. Brief of the States, supra note 25, at 25 (quoting Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v.
Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 46 n.20 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
214. Id.
215. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2565 (2013).
216. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
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A. The Making of a Meme
Petitioners seem to have hit on the winning theme almost by accident.
Veronica's blood quantum was not raised in the proceedings below and
only appeared in the record through the letter to the Cherokee Nation
stating that Brown was "1/8 Cherokee, supposedly enrolled."'21 7 In their
reply brief arguing for a writ of certiorari, Petitioners stated in a footnote
that "Baby Girl is 1/2 Hispanic and 1/16 Cherokee. 218 (This conflation of
Hispanic heritage with a particular racial makeup is questionable as well-
Latin Americans may be White, Black, Asian, or American Indian, and are
frequently some combination of these-but it is consistent with the efforts
of Petitioners and their allies to reduce ethnic and cultural identity to
biology.) In their first brief on the merits, Petitioners stated, again in a
footnote, "[w]e have since reviewed records from Baby Girl's paternal
grandparents reflecting that Baby [G]irl is 3/256 Cherokee." 219
It was left for Clement, on behalf of the Guardian ad Litem, to turn this
assertion into a battle cry. He began his brief with the claim that "Baby
Girl's sole link to any tribe is her 3/256ths of Cherokee blood. The central
question in this case is whether that is enough to work a Copernican shift
in the relationship between the parties. ' ' 2 He repeated the 3/256ths
assertion five more times in his brief.221 He also repeated the statement in
his argument before the Court2 2 2 and was in such a haste to repeat it again
before closing that he stumbled and had to substitute the easier to say "1
percent. ' 2
23
By the time Clement sat down, the seed had taken root. When Charles
Rothfeld224 stood up to argue for Respondents, the Justices took up the
refrain. 225 Chief Justice Roberts asked him
is there at all a threshold before you can call, under the
statute, a child an 'Indian child'? 3/256ths? And what if the
tribe-what if you had a tribe with a zero percent blood
217. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 731 S.E.2d 550, 554 (S.C. 2012), rev'd, 133 S. Ct. 2552
(internal quotation marks omitted).
218. See Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra note 129, at 5 n.1.
219. See Brief for Petitioners, Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (No. 12-399), 2013 WL
633597, at *6 n.1.
220. Reply Brief for Guardian ad Litem, ex rel. Baby Girl, Supporting Reversal at 1, Adoptive
Couple, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (No. 12-399).
221. Id. at 2, 8, 16, 20-21.
222. Transcript of Oral Argument at 28, Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (No. 12-399) ("[I]t
happened because of 3/256ths of Cherokee blood.").
223. See id. at 29.
224. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
225. Students who have been told to have a "theme of the case" and work their legal arguments
into it should take note: It works!
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requirement; they're open for, you know, people who want to
apply, who think culturally they're a Cherokee or-or any
number of fundamentally accepted conversions.226
He returned to this theme later, stating, "I'm just wondering is 3/256ths
close-close to zero? I mean, that's-that's the question in terms to me,
that if you have a definition, is it one drop of blood that triggers all these
extraordinary rights? '227 After Rothfeld sought to establish that Cherokee
citizenship relies not on blood quantum but lineal descent, Justice Alito
introduced a variation on the theme, asking: "But what if a tribe makes
eligibility available for anybody who, as a result of a DNA test, can
establish any Indian ancestry, no matter how slight?, 228 Justice Sonia
Sotomayor finally intervened, giving Rothfeld the opportunity to turn the
final minutes of his argument back to statutory interpretation.229
Focusing on the portion of the oral argument dealing with statutory
interpretation, one might predict a win for Respondents. The Justices
generally poked holes in Petitioners' statutory arguments, but not the
Respondents'. On reading the opinion, however, one realizes that the
3/256ths meme was more important than the statutory text. Justice Alito
began his opinion for the majority with this sentence: "This case is about a
little girl (Baby Girl) who is classified as an Indian because she is 1.2%
(3/256) Cherokee."23 After reciting the facts and procedural history, the
Court repeated the phrase: "It is undisputed that, had Baby Girl not been
3/256 Cherokee, Biological Father would have had no right to object to her
adoption under South Carolina law. ' '231 One did not need to read the
statutory analysis to know that Petitioners would win.
B. Disputing the "Undisputed"
In reality, blood quantum had nothing to do with ICWA's application to
Veronica, and her actual blood quantum is probably not 3/256ths
Cherokee. ICWA does not require any fraction of Indian blood. Rather, it
states that an "Indian child" is "any unmarried person who is under age
eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for
membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an
Indian tribe. 232 This definition is predominantly political. While children
who are not yet enrolled in an Indian tribe must be biological children of
226. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 222, at 38-39, Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. 2552
(No. 12-399).
227. Id. at 42.
228. Id. at 42-43.
229. See id. at43-51.
230. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2556.
231. Id. at 2559.
232. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) (2012).
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members of the tribe, it is membership or eligibility for membership in an
Indian tribe that defines Indian status.2 33 Indeed, the South Dakota
Supreme Court has held that a child without Indian heritage who had been
adopted by a Lakota family and had become a member of their tribe is an
"Indian child" for purposes of the act.234
Veronica was an Indian child under ICWA because her father was a
citizen of the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma and she was eligible for
Cherokee citizenship. Her eligibility did not depend on blood quantum.
Like a significant plurality of tribes, 235 the Cherokee Nation does not
require any particular degree of heritage, but instead requires establishing
one lineal ancestor from particular historical census rolls.236 For the
Cherokee Nation, this means proof of descent from the Dawes Rolls,
census rolls created by the federal government between 1899 and 1906 in
preparation for "allotment," the division and sale of Cherokee, Choctaw,
Chickasaw, Creek, and Seminole land.237
Although the rolls ostensibly record blood quantum, these "blood"
determinations are well known to be inaccurate. Despite frequent
intermarriage, the rolls did not include heritage from tribes other than the
tribe at issue;238 and for many with some African heritage, they failed to
include any Cherokee heritage at all. 239 Additionally, some traditional
Cherokee citizens refused to enroll at all, resisting the destruction of the
tribe the Dawes Rolls sought to facilitate.24" Those who did enroll had
incentives to misrepresent their blood quantum to avoid the federal
property restrictions imposed on those of Cherokee blood.24 1 Therefore,
233. See id. § 1903(4)(b).
234. In re Dependency & Neglect of A.L., 442 N.W.2d 233, 235 (S.D. 1989).
235. Kirsty Gover, Genealogy as Continuity: Explaining the Growing Tribal Preference for
Descent Rules in Membership Governance in the United States, 33 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 243, 271
(2008) (noting that 44% of tribal constitutions reviewed in a comprehensive study followed a lineal
descent rule).
236. See Citizenship, CHERoKEENATioN,http://www.cherokee.org/Services/TribalCitizenship/
Citizenship.aspx (last visited Jan. 12, 2015); see also Paul Spruhan, A Legal History of Blood
Quantum in Federal Indian Law to 1935, 51 S.D. L. REV. 1,48 (2006) (discussing blood quantum
and lineal descent in regard to Indian tribal membership).
237. Id. at 30, 40-41.
238. ANGIE DEBO, AND STILL THE WATERS RuN: THE BETRAYAL OF THE FIVE CIVILIZED TRIBES
47 (1973); see also, e.g., Cully v. Mitchell, 37 F.2d 493,494 (10th Cir. 1930).
239. Spruhan, supra note 236, at 41.
240. DEBO, supra note 238, at 37. Allotment was imposed despite steadfast Cherokee
objection, id. at 32-33, and would ultimately result in most of the Cherokee Nation being sold to
non-Indians. Arter completion, moreover, Cherokee Nation courts would be dissolved and
Cherokee Nation laws would no longer be recognized. Act of June 29, 1898, ch. 517, § 28, 30 Stat.
495, 504-05.
241. After 1904, only allottees without Indian blood could alienate their lands, see REPORT OF
THE U.S. INDIAN INSPECTOR FOR -m INDIAN TERRITORY 30 (1905), while after 1906, only allottees
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many, like Brown, who Maldonado believed to have one-eighth Cherokee
descent, report more heritage than can be proven from the Dawes Rolls,
while others, like Maldonado, report Cherokee heritage not reflected on the
rolls at all, and there is reason to believe some of these reports are
accurate.
242
In short, when the majority confidently declared that "[i]t is undisputed
that, had Baby Girl not been 3/256 Cherokee, Biological Father would
have had no right to object to her adoption under South Carolina law, '243 it
was wrong on three counts. First, Veronica likely had more Cherokee
heritage from her father than is reflected in the Dawes Rolls and, if her
mother's testimony is credible, some Cherokee heritage from her mother as
well.2 " Second, Veronica's quantum of Cherokee blood was irrelevant to
her citizenship in the Cherokee Nation. Therefore, third, under federal law,
Veronica's "Cherokee blood" was not the reason her father had rights to
object to her adoption.
C. Settler Colonialism for a Modern Era
The factual and legal inaccuracies in the 3/256ths meme are, of course,
not the central problem. The central problem is why the claim, whatever its
merit, was so compelling to the Justices. The easy answer is that racial
classifications are inconsistent with American ideology, or at least with the
ideology of color-blindness. The Justices' focus on the alleged small
degree of heritage casts the lie on this answer. If the Justices really
objected to classification by race, they should not have objected to
applying ICWA to a child like Veronica, who was not obviously racially
Indian. This objection was not a product of America's relatively recent
with less than full Indian blood could do so, Act of Apr. 26, 1906, ch. 1876, § 20, 34 Stat. 145
(1906).
242. See Dan Littlefield, Study of Historical Facts Clarifies Freedman Citizenship Issue,
CHEROKEE PHOENIX, available at http://www.cherokeephoenix.org/Article/Index/1760 (last visited
Jan. 12, 2015) ("Cherokee family stories commonly tell how an ancestor on the Dawes roll is listed
as half blood when he or she was really full. Most of those stories are probably true. Knowing that
they would likely be labeled incompetent, many Cherokees probably chose voluntarily to lower
their blood quantum."); see also, e.g., Stephen Herrington, Elizabeth Warren: Record ofAmerican
Indian Heritage Was Destroyed in 1906, HUFFINGTON POST (July 22, 2012, 5:12 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/stephen-herrington/re-elizabeth-warren-ameri_b_I 535095.html
(discussing the Choctaw author's family's story). Because Congress decreed that the blood quantum
determinations on the Dawes Rolls are conclusive, however, courts have repeatedly held that these
determinations cannot be amended, even if determinations regarding an enrollee's other family
members establish the inaccuracy of the records. See, e.g., Cully, 37 F.2d at 494-95, 499 (refusing
to change legal determination that daughter had one-quarter Indian blood based on rolls records,
although her mother was recorded as being one-half Seminole, and her father as being full Creek).
243. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2559 (2013).
244. See supra note 47 and accompanying text (quoting the letter from the birth mother's
attorney to the Cherokee Nation stating the birth mother's belief that she is part Cherokee).
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rejection of racial classifications, but instead of a much older ideology: the
expectation and insistence on the absorption and disappearance of
indigenous peoples.
One could see Adoptive Couple as part of the campaign to enforce
color-blindness as an equality principle, and some of the Justices certainly
did. This was, after all, the term in which the Supreme Court both
invalidated the preclearance portions of the Voting Rights Act in Shelby
County v. Holder24 5 and narrowed the eye of the needle that universities
must thread to consider race in admissions in Fisher v. University of Texas
at Austin.24 6 Chief Justice John Roberts, at least, has shown some
confusion about the difference between Native sovereignty and affirmative
action, arguing in his confirmation hearings that his representation of the
State of Hawaii in Rice v. Cayetano247 -a case regarding voting for the
trustees of Native Hawaiian trust land 24 8-was an argument in favor of
affirmative action.249 But classifying Indians in this way confuses the
different racial logic applied to African Americans and Indians. The
discussion of race in the Adoptive Couple oral argument shows that the
Justices were not primarily concerned about special rights for Indians, but
instead about ensuring that those rights remained limited to a small and
racially defined group.
The dominant understanding of the role of race in America emerges
from the history of slavery and the control of African American and later
immigrant laborers. The colonial domination of indigenous peoples, in
contrast, was founded in the desire to establish control over the land and
ideological superiority over the nation.25 0 This generates stark differences
in the regulation of boundaries between the dominated and dominating
peoples. While the boundaries between African Americans and Whites, for
example, were rigidly maintained, the boundaries between Indians and
Whites were deliberately porous, and intermarriage resulting in
assimilation into the colonizing group was often encouraged.2 1' As
Professor Patrick Wolfe wrote in his foundational work on settler
colonialism in Australia, although "the one-drop rule has meant that the
category 'black' can withstand unlimited admixture, the category 'red' has
245. 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013).
246. 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2421 (2013).
247. 528 U.S. 495 (2000).
248. Id. at510-11.
249. See N. BRUCE DUTHu, AMERICAN INDIANS AND THE LAW 142 (2008).
250. See Bethany R. Berger, Red: Racism and the American Indian, 56 UCLA L. REV. 59 1,
593-94 (2009) [hereinafter Berger, Red]; VINE DELORIA JR., CUSTER DIED FOR YOUR SINS: AN
INDIAN MANIFESTO 173-74 (1988).
251. Berger, Red, supra note 250, at 594-95, 626, 633-44.
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been highly vulnerable to dilution., 252 The result was to increase
commodified black labor, "so that white plantation owners father black
children," but "white fathers generated so-called 'half-breeds' whose
indigeneity was compromised.,
25 3
Although Wolfe wrote primarily about Australia, racial mixing has
been advocated as a means to end Indian-ness throughout U.S. history.
Pocahontas was celebrated as an example of successful conversion and
civilization of an Indian princess by intermarriage.254 In the same year that
Thomas Jefferson proposed forcible removal of Indian tribes beyond the
Mississippi, he also advised the Delawares to "mix with us by marriage,
your blood will run in our veins, and will spread over this great island.,
255
Later, at the height of Jim Crow, in 1888 Congress enacted a statute
providing citizenship to Indian women who married white men to
encourage assimilation.256 American-Indian scholar Vine Deloria Jr. wrote
that when he worked in Washington, D.C. with the National Congress of
American Indians, "it was a rare day when some white didn't visit [his]
office and proudly proclaim that he or she was of Indian descent. "257 The
claimants often intend by these claims to assert sympathy with Indians and
defend against claims of racism. For Indians fighting for the existence of
their tribes, however, these claims are only a reminder of the successful
destruction of tribal identity.
The distinct racial and cultural ethos of settler colonialism has
important implications for adoption of Indian children and perceptions of
Indian race. Incorporation of Indians into white families has been part of
American policy from the celebrated kidnapping and marriage of
Pocahontas by the Virginia Company258 to the partnership between the
Bureau of Indian Affairs with the Child Welfare League of America to
move Indian children to homes far from the reservation in the 1950s and
1960s.259 Although the federal program itself did not cover many children,
252. PATRICK WOLFE, SETTLER COLONIALISM AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF ANTHROPOLOGY:
THE POLITICS AND POETICS OF AN ETHNOGRAPHIC EVENT 1-2 (1999) (footnote omitted).
253. Id. at 2.
254. See Bethany Ruth Berger, After Pocahontas: Indian Women and the Law, 1830 to 1934,
21 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 1, 2 (1997) [hereinafter Berger, After Pocahontas].
255. Berger, Red, supra note 250, at 627.
256. See Act of Aug. 9, 1888, ch. 818, § 2, 25 Stat. 392, 392 (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. § 182 (1888)).
257. DELORIA, supra note 250, at 2-3. Deloria also noted that these claimed ancestors were
always women. Id. at 3.
258. See RALPH HAMOR, A TRUE DISCOURSE OF THE PRESENT STATE OF VIRGINIA 4-11 (Va.
State Library 1957) (1615).
259. See DAVID FANSHEL, FAR FROM THE RESERVATION: THE TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION OF INDIAN
CHILDREN, at ix (1972); 2 FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN INDIANS 1153-54 (1984).
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it represented a widely held idea that Indian children were better off away
from their birth families. In the legislative report on the Indian Child
Welfare Act, for example, Congress found that one in four Indian children
under age one in Minnesota were adopted and that, in Washington, Indian
children were nineteen times more likely to be adopted than other
children.26 °
There is no credible argument that the Capobiancos actively tried to
take Veronica away from an Indian environment-all the reliable evidence
suggests that they simply wanted a child to love. Nevertheless, adoption of
Indian children into non-Indian homes has a particularly honored and
accepted place in American culture. Further, the notion of easy and
beneficial assimilation of Indian children into white culture helps fuel the
desirability of Indian children as adoptees.
More importantly, the simultaneous fragility and romanticization of
Indian status posed a significant challenge to the claim that Veronica could
be considered Indian or Cherokee. The possibility that a child could remain
politically Indian after generations of intermarriage undermined the
assumption that Indian tribes would eventually disappear. The questions of
Justices Roberts and Alito reflect this concern: would recognizing
Veronica as Cherokee mean that tribes could be "open for, you know,
people who want to apply, who think culturally they're a Cherokee or-or
any number of fundamentally accepted conversions," 261 or "anybody who,
as a result of a DNA test, can establish any Indian ancestry, no matter how
slight? '262 At the same time, the idea that Dusten Brown-phenotypically
White and a soldier in the U.S. Army-was in fact Indian undermined
romantic notions of Indians as isolated sources of mysticism and a spiritual
connection to the natural world.
The Supreme Court's focus on biological race, moreover, led it to
ignore the evidence that the Browns were traditionally Indian in all other
senses of the word. First, as enrolled citizens, Brown and his family were
politically part of the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma; Brown's father even
voted in Cherokee elections.263 Second, they were geographically part of
the Cherokee Nation. Although Justice Thomas's opinion asserted that the
Browns did not live on a reservation,264 the Cherokee Nation no longer has
a formal reservation.2 65 What it does have is a fourteen-county
260. H.R.REP.No. 95-1386, at9 (1978).
261. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 222, at 38-39 (quoting Roberts, C.J.).
262. Id. at 43 (quoting Alito, J.).
263. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 731 S.E.2d 550, 566 n.28 (S.C. 2012), rev'd, 133 S. Ct.
2552 (2013).
264. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2570 (Thomas, J., concurring).
265. See Frequently Asked Questions, CHEROKEE NATION, http://www.cherokee.org/
AboutTheNation/FrequentlyAskedQuestions.aspx (last visited Jan. 12, 2015) ("Where is the
Cherokee Nation? The Cherokee Nation is not a reservation; it is a 7,000 square mile jurisdictional
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jurisdictional area in Northeastern Oklahoma, and Notawa and Bartlesville,
where Brown, his parents, and Maldonado live, are part of it.266 Although
Brown lived on a military base when the case arose, the Cherokee Nation
was where Brown grew up and called home, and where he returned after
his tour in Iraq. 26
7
Finally, the Supreme Court ignored the evidence that Brown was very
much culturally Cherokee as well. His family owned Indian trust land in
Pryor and Cayuga, Oklahoma, had traditional ties with their extended
relatives, and were proud of their membership in the Wolf Clan.268 They
regularly prepared traditional foods such as "grape dumplings, buckskin
bread, Indian cornbread, Indian tacos, wild onions, fry bread, polk salad
and deer meat," and attended Cherokee holidays in Tahlequah,
Oklahoma-the Cherokee Nation's capitol.269 The family court found that
Brown was a "Cherokee in more than name only" and that his "heritage
and culture are very important to him and always ha[ve] been."270
By every measure except race, the Browns were a Cherokee family
living in a Cherokee community. In the name of racial equality, however,
the Supreme Court constrained the application of ICWA, in part, because
the Browns just were not racially Indian enough. This was not a
manifestation of egalitarianism, but rather of something much older: the
belief that the dilution of Indian blood should end Indian tribes and the
Indian problem once and for all.
D. Equal Protection Evasions
But doesn't the role of Indian heritage in Cherokee enrollment, and
therefore in ICWA, render it suspect under the equal protection
implications of the Fifth Amendment? No. Both ICWA and its application
to this case are consistent with the original understanding of the Equal
Protection Clause, decades of unquestioned Supreme Court opinions, and
state court consensus in ICWA cases with facts like these.
As I have discussed elsewhere, the drafters of the Fourteenth
Amendment understood that protecting the sovereignty and separate rights
of Native peoples was as much a matter of equality as preventing state
area covering all of eight counties and portions of six additional counties in Northeastern
Oklahoma.").
266. See Cherokee Nation Jurisdiction, CHEROKEE NATION, http://www.cherokee.org/Portals/O/
Documents/2013/01/33080CherokeeNationJurisdiction.pdf(last visited Jan. 12,2015); Adoptive
Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 553.
267. Seeid. at 553, 555 &n.l1.
268. Id. at 565 n.28.
269. Id. (quoting the family court); see also National Holiday, CHEROKEE NATION,
http://www.cherokee.org/AboutTheNation/NationalHoliday.aspx (last visited Jan. 12, 2015).
270. Brief in Opposition, supra note 30, at *9 (quoting the family court).
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discrimination against African Americans.271 More importantly, as the
Supreme Court first began to confront questions of reverse discrimination
under the Equal Protection Clause, it decided in Morton v. Mancari27 2 that
federal measures providing different treatment to Native people are
constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment so long as they "can be tied
rationally to the fulfillment of Congress's unique obligation toward the
Indians."2 73 There, the Court upheld an employment preference for Indians
in the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), reasoning that given the unique
degree of control the BIA held over Indians lives, such a measure was
rationally related to the goal of increasing tribal self-governance.274 The
Court further reasoned that because the application of the preference
required membership in a federally recognized Indian tribe, the measure
was "political rather than racial in nature. '" 275
Since then, the Supreme Court has relied upon Mancari to uphold a
number of different federal programs treating Indians differently, as well as
state actions implementing federal obligations.276 One of these cases,
Fisher v. District Court,277 was a precursor to ICWA. In Fisher, the Court
held that tribal courts had exclusive jurisdiction over an adoption dispute
between tribal members and that such exclusive jurisdiction was not
impermissible racial discrimination but, rather, a necessary result of
retained self-government of the tribe.278 Most recently, in 2000, Rice v.
Cayetano279 struck down a state scheme giving Native Hawaiians special
voting rights in state elections, 280 but reaffirmed the validity of Mancari
and its progeny, stating: "Of course, as we have established in a series of
cases, Congress may fulfill its treaty obligations and its responsibilities to
the Indian tribes by enacting legislation dedicated to their circumstances
271. See Bethany R. Berger, Reconciling EqualProtection and Federal Indian Law, 98 CALWi.
L. REV. 1165, 1172-79 (2010) [hereinafter Berger, Reconciling Equal Protection and Federal
Indian Law].
272. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
273. Id. at 555. See generally Berger, Reconciling Equal Protection and Federal Indian Law,
supra note 271, at 1183-86.
274. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 554.
275. Id. at 553 n.24.
276. See, e.g., Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439
U.S. 463, 500-01, 504 (1979) (discussing civil and criminal jurisdiction); United States v.
Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 645-47 (1977) (upholding criminal statutes that based jurisdiction on
tribal membership); Del. Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 84-86 (1977) (discussing
eligibility for compensation for illegal acquisition of tribal land); Fisher v. Dist. Ct., 424 U.S. 382,
390-91 (1976) (discussing jurisdiction in adoption cases).
277. 424 U.S. 382.
278. Id. at 390-91.
279. 528 U.S. 495 (2000).
280. Id. at 499, 524.
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and needs."281
ICWA easily fits within the Mancari precedent. The provisions
regarding exclusive tribal jurisdiction over Indian children domiciled on a
reservation largely codify Fisher v. District Court.28 2 The provisions
requiring truly voluntary consent to relinquish custody and preventing
unnecessary involuntary removals of children 28 3 try to ensure that Indian
communities and tribes do not lose their future generations without
cause. 284 Because, as Congress recognized, "there is no resource that is
more vital to the continued existence and integrity of Indian tribes than
their children,, 285 these goals are well within "Congress'[s] unique
obligation toward the Indians., 28 6 In addition, because ICWA applies only
to children who are either tribal citizens, or whose parents are tribal
citizens and who are eligible for citizenship themselves, it accomplishes
these goals through a classification that rests squarely on "political rather
than racial" belonging.28 7
Therefore, although ICWA has faced several state and lower federal
court challenges under the equal protection implications of the Fifth
Amendment, all but one court has rejected such challenges. 28 8 The one
court to uphold a constitutional challenge is the third division of the
California appellate courts, which, in a split with the other divisions, found
that ICWA may be unconstitutional as applied to "children whose
biological parents do not have a significant social, cultural or political
281. Id at 519.
282. See 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) (2012).
283. See id. §§ 1912-13.
284. See id. § 1901(2)-(5) (discussing the congressional findings underlying ICWA).
285. Id. § 1901(3).
286. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974). See generally Berger, Reconciling
Equal Protection and Federal Indian Law, supra note 271, at 1183-86.
287. See Mancari, 417 U.S. at 553 n.24. Although some raised concerns about ICWA's
coverage of children who had not themselves formally enrolled in their tribes, Congress determined
that "[t]he constitutional and plenary power of Congress over Indians and Indian tribes and affairs
cannot be made to hinge upon the cranking into operation of a mechanical [enrollment] process
established under tribal law, particularly with respect to Indian children who, because of their
minority, cannot make a reasoned decision about their tribal and Indian identity." H.R. REP. No. 95-
1386, at 17 (1978). In contrast, the Iowa Supreme Court has held that a state statute that applied
ICWA to children who were not eligible for tribal membership was unconstitutional. In re A. W.,
741 N.W.2d 793, 813 (Iowa 2007).
288. See, e.g., In re Appeal in Pima Cnty. Juvenile Action, 635 P.2d 187, 193 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1981) (rejecting the challenge); In re Armell, 550 N.E.2d 1060, 1067-68 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)
(same); In re A.B., 663 N.W.2d 625, 636 (N.D. 2003) (same); In re Adoption of Child of Indian
Heritage, 529 A.2d 1009, 1010 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (noting that the Act has been held
constitutional), aff'd, 543 A.2d 925 (1988); In re Guardianship of D.L.L., 291 N.W.2d 278, 281
(S.D. 1980) (rejecting the challenge).
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relationship with an Indian community., 289 No court, however, has found
that ICWA is unconstitutional as applied to a child whose biological family
is so fully socially, culturally, and politically Cherokee as the Browns. The
Court's ominous reference to "equal protection concerns ,,29' therefore,
was deliberately vague; to uncover its foundation would reveal that it was
built upon air.
IV. MARGINALIZING MOTHERS
The decision in Adoptive Couple may appear, at first glance, to be a
feminist one: a single mother unsupported by the birth father gets exclusive
rights to make decisions for her child. Further examination, however,
shows the decision was founded in ideas about parenthood that are
destructive for women, particularly women of color, and their children.
This Part shows the links between the rise and fall of the constitutional
rights of nonmarital fathers and those of nonmarital mothers and children,
and their relationship to policies reducing support for families headed by
single women and facilitating adoption of their children.
A. The Rise and Fall of Constitutional Rights of
Unmarried Fathers
For most of U.S. history, the law sharply divided the rights of parents
and children in marital and non-marital families. Until well into the
twentieth century, fathers had substantial--even supreme-rights
regarding their children by marriage, 291 and such children had economic
and legal rights with respect to those fathers.292 A child of unmarried
parents, however, was historically consideredfilius nullius, the child of no
one,293 and even their mothers were denied many parental rights.294 Even
after unmarried mothers and children began to be recognized as family
289. In re Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507, 526 (Dist. Ct. App. 1996); see also In re Santos
Y., 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 692, 718-19, 730-3 1(Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (affirming the doctrine of In re
Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507). Commentators have roundly criticized this line of decisions. See
Carole Goldberg, Descent into Race, 49 UCLA L. REv. 1373, 1380-88 (2002); Lorie M. Graham,
"The Past Never Vanishes ": A Contextual Critique of the Existing Indian Family Doctrine, 23 AM.
INDIAN L. REv. 1, 34-43 (1998).
290. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2565 (2013).
291. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child? ": Meyer and Pierce and the
Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REv. 995, 1036-50 (1992).
292. Id. at 1037-38.
293. Laura Oren, Honor Thy Mother?: The Supreme Court's Jurisprudence of Motherhood, 17
HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 187, 189 (2006).
294. "Neither subsequent marriage of the parents, nor paternity established by
acknowledgment could 'legitimate' an illegitimate child." Susan E. Satava, Comment,
Discrimination Against the Unacknowledged Illegitimate Child and the Wrongful Death Statute, 25
CAP. U. L. REv. 933, 937 (1996).
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units in the nineteenth century, they were denied many of the legal rights
attached to the parent-child relationship; unmarried fathers, moreover, had
no rights or responsibilities at all.295
These legal rules reflected three concepts deeply linked to the unequal
status of women: first, pregnancy outside of marriage was a shameful,
marginalized state; second, only a legal relationship to a man could
establish full legal personhood; and third, absent such a legal tie, men had
little emotional or caretaking attachment to their children.296 Families of
color suffered particularly under these rules, both because of higher rates of
illegitimacy 297 and because of disregard of their attachment to their
children.298
Both the stigma of unmarried motherhood and the acceptance of
paternal domination of the marital family suffered serious setbacks in the
1960s and 1970s, and courts and legislatures shifted accordingly. Although
the first challenges came in cases involving motherhood, part of this
clearly feminist development was the recognition that fathers, whether
married or not, also had interests in the care and welfare of their children.
By the 1980s, however, the Court began to reassert the distinctions of
legitimacy, reducing parental rights of unmarried fathers to facilitate the
claims of married husbands.
295. See Oren, supra note 293, at 189, 191.
296. See Michelle Oberman, Mothers Who Kill: Coming to Terms with Modern American
Infanticide, 34 AM. CRim. L. REv. 1, 71 (1996) ("[Tlhere still is considerable shame and guilt
associated with a teenager's pregnancy."); Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work: The First Woman's
Rights Claims Concerning Wives'Household Labor, 1850-1880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073, 1082-84
(1994) (summarizing in part the inequality of wives before the law); Matthew B. Firing, Note, In
Whose Best Interests? Courts'Failure to Apply State Custodial Laws Equally Amongst Spouses
and Its Constitutional Implications, 20 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 223, 228 (2007) (explaining that
effective fatherhood from the early 1880s through the early 1900s was measured by the father's
ability to earn income, not the emotional bonds he forged with his children).
297. See generally Steven Ruggles, The Origins of African-American Family Structure, 59
AM. Soc. REv. 136, 136,138 (1990) (noting that, from 1880 to 1990, "black children were two to
three times more likely to reside without one or both parents than were white children").
298. The boarding school system was the greatest symptom of this notion regarding Native
people. See, e.g., In re Can-Ah-Couqua, 29 F. 687, 687, 689, 690 (D. Alaska 1887) (rejecting an
Alaska Native mother's habeas corpus action for the release of her eight-year-old son after three
years in boarding school although "the profligate and dissolute life she has lived has not entirely
extinguished the natural affection and love of a mother's heart"); see also Berger, After Pocahontas,
supra note 254, at 44-45 (discussing assumptions that Native women cared little for their children,
who should be removed for their own good). The brutal system of slavery is the paradigmatic
example of disrespect for relationships between African American parents and children, although
suspicion of parents' unwillingness or inability to raise their own children, and practices of
separating children from their parents to put them to work continued long after. BRIGGS, supra note
174, at 49-52; see also DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATrERED BoNDs: TfE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE 65
(2002) (discussing denigration and disregard for relationship between Black mothers and their
children in welfare reform discourse).
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The Supreme Court first affirmed the constitutional rights of nonmarital
children and their mothers with a pair of 1968 cases involving Louisiana
law. Levy v. Louisiana299 invalidated a law preventing nonmarital children
from suing for the wrongful death of their mother,300 while Glona v.
American Guarantee and Liability Insurance Co. 30 1 invalidated a law
preventing nonmarital mothers from suing for the wrongful deaths of their
children.302 In 1972, the Court affirmed the connection between nonmarital
fathers and their children by striking down a provision of Louisiana's
worker's compensation scheme that denied death benefits to illegitimate
children who had lived with the dead worker but whom he had not
formally acknowledged.30 3
Stanley v. Illinois,3° the first case to acknowledge the parental rights
(as opposed to simply obligations) of unmarried fathers, was decided later
that year.30 5 There, in a case in which an unmarried father's rights in the
children he had lived with their entire lives were terminated without a
hearing, the Court held that the interest "of a man in the children he has
sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful
countervailing interest, protection."3 6 Over the next few years, the Court
decided several more cases regarding the relationship between nonmarital
fathers and their children.
Some of these cases involved the rights of nonmarital children to claim
support from their fathers. Gomez v. Perez,317 for example, invalidated a
Texas law providing that only marital children could demand child support
from their fathers, 30 8 while Trimble v. Gordon30 9 struck down an Illinois
law providing that nonmarital children could not be the intestate heirs of
their fathers. 310 Other cases supported the desire of nonmarital fathers to
299. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
300. Id. at 72 ("These children, though illegitimate, were dependent on her; she cared for them
and nurtured them; they were indeed hers in the biological and in the spiritual sense; in her death
they suffered wrong in the sense that any dependent would.").
301. 391 U.S. 73 (1968).
302. Id. at 75. In Glona, the State sought to defend the scheme with its desire to discourage
illegitimacy. While not stating that the purpose itself was invalid, the Court found it inapplicable
here: "[W]e see no possible rational basis for assuming that if the natural mother is allowed
recovery for the wrongful death of her illegitimate child, the cause of illegitimacy will be served. It
would, indeed, be farfetched to assume that women have illegitimate children so that they can be
compensated in damages for their death." Id.
303. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 165 (1972).
304. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
305. Id. at 658-59.
306. Id. at 651.
307. 409 U.S. 535 (1973).
308. Id. at 537-38.
309. 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
310. Id. at 763, 766.
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care for their children. Thus, Jimenez v. Weinberger3 ' allowed fathers to
claim Social Security disability benefits for nonmarital children born after
the disability began,31 2 while Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld 3 3 held that fathers
were entitled to survivor's Social Security benefits after the death of their
wives. 3
14
In Wiesenfeld, the Social Security Administration sought to restrict
survivor's benefits to women on the grounds that the benefits were
designed to permit the survivor to remain home with the children, but the
Court found that "[i]t is no less important for a child to be cared for by its
sole surviving parent when that parent is male rather than female." '315 Ruth
Bader Ginsburg litigated Wiesenfeld for the Women's Rights Project of the
ACLU,316 and the reason why is clear: Breaking down the legal
presumption that only mothers had an interest in or responsibility for
childcare was a key goal of the feminist movement.31 7
In 1978, on the eve of the passage of ICWA, Quilloin v. Walcott318 held
that an unwed father who had neither lived with nor made any effort to
legitimate his child for eleven years after their birth had no constitutional
right to veto a stepfather's adoption of the child.3 19 Quilloin was a rare
unanimous decision on the rights of unwed fathers, and the opinion
sensitively recognized both the rights of biological parents and the rights of
families not formed through biology.
The Quilloin Court reiterated that "[i]t is cardinal with us that the
custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents," 320 and
declared it "firmly established that 'freedom of personal choice in matters
of family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. ,,32' But the Court emphasized that "this is not
a case in which the unwed father at any time had, or sought, actual or legal
custody of his child," or one where "adoption would place the child with a
new set of parents with whom the child had never before lived. Rather, the
311. 417 U.S. 628 (1974).
312. Id. at 634-35.
313. 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
314. Id. at 651. During this time period, the court also summarily affirmed lower court
decisions striking down legislative distinctions between marital and nonmarital children. See, e.g.,
Davis v. Richardson, 342 F. Supp. 588, 589 (Dist. Ct. Conn.), aff'd, 409 U.S. 1069 (1972); Griffin
v. Richardson, 346 F. Supp. 1226, 1231 (Dist. Ct. Md.), aff'd, 409 U.S. 1069 (1972).
315. 420 U.S. at 651-52.
316. Id. at 637.
317. For an example of this theme in feminist writing, see BELL HOOKS, FEMINIST THEORY:
FROM MARGIN TO CENTER 138 (2d ed. 2000).
318. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
319. Id. at256.
320. Id. at 255 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158,166 (1944) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
321. Id. (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974)).
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result of the adoption in this case is to give full recognition to a family unit
already in existence, a result desired by all concerned, except appellant.
'3 22
In this situation, the Court found that the state did not need to establish that
the biological father was an unfit parent, but simply that the adoption was
"in the best interests of the child., 323
The next year, the Court illustrated the narrowness of the Quilloin
holding. Caban v. Mohammed324 held that it was unconstitutional to deny
an unmarried father-whose name was on his children's birth certificates
and who had lived with the children until his separation from their
mother-the right to block their adoption by the mother's new husband.325
The appellees in that case argued that the "closer relationship" a mother
bore to her children justified requiring the consent of unwed mothers, but
not fathers, before adoptions.326 The New York Court of Appeals upheld
the challenged distinction on the ground that requiring paternal consent
"would have the overall effect of denying homes to the homeless and of
depriving innocent children of the other blessings of adoption. The cruel
and undeserved out-of-wedlock stigma would continue its visitations. 327
The Supreme Court rejected both justifications. First, "[m]aternal and
paternal roles are not invariably different in importance.... [A]n unwed
father may have a relationship with his children fully comparable to that of
the mother."328 Second, although "some unwed fathers would prevent the
adoption of their illegitimate children,... [t]his impediment to adoption
usually is the result of a natural parental interest shared by both genders
alike."329
The Court soon shifted from its earlier rejection of distinctions based on
illegitimacy, upholding exclusion of unmarried mothers from survivor's
benefits after the death of the father of their children, 330 as well as different
technical state requirements before nonmarital children could have a legal
relationship to their parents.331 The parental rights of unmarried fathers
suffered a similar blow. In 1983, Lehr v. Robertson33 2 held that an
322. Id.
323. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
324. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
325. Id. at 394.
326. Id. at 388 (quoting oral argument).
327. In re Malpica-Orsini, 331 N.E.2d 486, 489 (N.Y. 1975).
328. Caban, 441 U.S. at 389.
329. Id. at 391-92.
330. Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282, 296 (1979).
331. See, e.g., Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 261-63, 264 (1978) (upholding a state law
requiring paternity to have been established by judicial decree during the life of the decedent to
establish intestate succession, in a case in which the father had acknowledged his children by
affidavit and provided them with child support during their lives).
332. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
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unmarried father was not entitled to notice or the right to prevent adoption
of his child by her stepfather where he had neither lived with her,
financially supported her, nor added his name to New York's putative
father registry.333
The Lehr case might seem similar to Quilloin, but Lehr had lived with
the mother (who struggled with mental illness) before the birth and visited
her in the hospital until she left with their daughter, Jessica, without telling
him where she was going. 334 During the next two years, Lehr repeatedly
searched for Jessica, occasionally finding and visiting her before her
mother would move again.335 Then, after he had been unable to find Jessica
for a year, Lehr finally located Jessica with the aid of a detective agency
after her mother had married.336 Before Lehr learned of the adoption
petition, he filed to establish paternity and visitation, and the judge in the
adoption case knew this.337 Nevertheless, the U.S. Supreme Court found
that Lehr was not entitled to notice of the petition for adoption by Jessica's
stepfather (much less the right to object to it) because he could have
established his rights by filing with the putative father registry-a registry
of which neither he nor the vast majority of unmarried fathers were
aware.338 Where previous cases could be read to distinguish between
willing and reluctant fathers, Lehr seemed to permit states to deny rights to
even willing fathers who had been thwarted in their desire to parent their
children.
Despite the links between condemnation of illegitimacy and
condemnation of women's sexual freedom, rules like those encouraged by
Lehr may still seem to forward women's interests. Why shouldn't women
facing the prospect of raising their children on their own have sole rights to
determine how their children are raised and by whom? The context of these
cases undermines this feminist gloss. Quilloin, Caban, and Lehr all
supported states in transferring legal bonds to children from unmarried
fathers to married husbands. They do not support women's freedom to
raise their children themselves, but rather their choice to legitimate them
through stepparent adoption. Stepparent adoptions comprise a large
333. Id. at 267-68, 274.
334. Id. at 268-69 (White, J., dissenting). Because the family court denied Lehr an opportunity
to be heard in the adoption case, Lehr was not permitted to establish these facts at trial. Id. at 271.
335. Id. at 269.
336. Id.
337. Id. at 252 (majority opinion); id. at 275 (White, J., dissenting).
338. See id. at 264 (majority opinion) (declaring that the father's ignorance of the registry was
not an excuse); Brief of Legal Services Organizations as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at
11-13, 52, Lehr 463 U.S. 248 (No. 81-1756) (noting that the existence of the registry was not
publicized anywhere, Lehr and the vast majority of unmarried fathers did not know of it, and that
even some Family Court clerks did not know that fathers could register with it before paternity had
been adjudicated).
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percentage of all adoptions.3 39 They usually involve a man adopting the
children of his new wife, and are the reason that men are twice as likely to
adopt as women.34° Limitations on the rights of unmarried fathers to object
to such adoptions were designed, in part: to encourage other men to take
advantage of the "noble" laws that permitted them to rescue children from
the "social stigma and consequences of bastardy;, 34 1 to permit them to
secure "a normal home for a child;" 342 and to legitimate children who were
deemed "at risk economically, medically, emotionally, and
educationally." 343
In 1989, the Court even more firmly established the rights of husbands
over biological unmarried fathers in Michael H. v. Gerald D.34 In that
case, Victoria was born of an affair between Michael and Carole while
Carole was married to Gerald.345 Soon after, Carole and Victoria moved in
with Michael, although they moved between living with Michael, Gerald,
and another man, Scott, over the next few years. 346 A blood test showed
with 98.07% certainty that Michael was Victoria's father.347 Michael
supported Carole and Victoria when he was permitted to, and Victoria
knew Michael as "Daddy., 348 Later, however, Carole reunited with
Gerald.349 When Michael filed to establish paternity and visitation rights,
Gerald intervened, declaring that under California law a husband was the
presumptive father of children born to his wife, and Michael had no
standing to challenge that presumption. 350
Although Victoria's Guardian ad Litem argued that granting Michael
visitation would be in the child's best interests, a plurality of the Supreme
Court held that neither Michael nor Victoria had any due process rights
339. Evan B. Donaldson Adoption Inst., Safeguarding the Rights and Well-Being of
Birthparents in the Adoption Process 16 (2007), available at http://www.adoptioninstitute.org/old/
publications/2006_1 1BirthparentStudyAll.pdf (noting that stepparent adoptions constituted
42% of adoptions in 1992, but have stopped being tracked by courts, and have likely reduced
somewhat since then).
340. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
No. 23-27, ADOPTION EXPERIENCES OF WOMEN AND MEN AND DEMAND FOR CHILDREN TO ADOPT BY
WOMEN 18-44 YEARS OF AGE IN THE UNITED STATES, 2002, at 1, 16 (2008), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr23/sr23_027.pdf.
341. Brief for Appellees Robertson at 16, Lehr, 463 U.S. 248 (No. 81-1756), 1982 LEXIS
215, at *16.
342. In re Malpica-Orsini, 331 N.E.2d 486, 491 (N.Y. 1975).
343. See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 266 n.25 (internal quotation marks omitted).
344. 491 U.S. 110, 113 (1989).
345. Id. at 113-14.
346. Id. at 114.
347. Id.
348. Id. at 143-44 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
349. Id. at 115 (majority opinion).
350. Id.
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requiring a hearing on paternity or visitation.35" ' Emphasizing the "historic
respect-indeed, sanctity" that the law accorded the "unitary family," a
family "typified, of course, by the marital family,"352 the Court found that
Michael's relationship to his biological child was not "so deeply embedded
within our traditions as to be a fundamental right. 35 3 When confronted
with marriage, the biology-plus approach of the earlier cases lost hands
down.3 54 Although biology alone still gave unmarried mothers rights with
respect to their children, the choice of marital "parenthood" over biology
would have deep implications for birth mothers in adoption policy.
B. Links Between Denigration of Unmarried Fathers and
Condemnation of Poor Single Mothers
The resurgence of legal differences stemming from unmarried
parenthood was part of a much broader trend, one in which opposition to
illegitimacy was repackaged from a moral issue to a socio-economic
one. 35 5 Daniel Moynihan, Assistant Secretary of Labor under Presidents
John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, had already made condemning
illegitimacy safe for liberals with the 1965 Report, The Negro Family: The
Case for National Action, which called the "matriarchy" of unmarried
black women a key part of the "tangle of pathology" that left black
communities poor and crime-ridden.356 In the 1980s, President Ronald
Reagan made the imagined "welfare queen"--black, unmarried, and using
her children to live in luxury on welfare payments-the central figure in
his campaign against welfare.357 In the late 1980s, media frenzies
demonized poor single mothers of color over "crack babies"--
presumptively black, possibly Latino-and children with Fetal Alcohol
Syndrome (FAS)-presumptively Native American.358 Although meta-
analysis of scientific studies later showed that crack use did not have
consistent effects on cognitive or psychomotor development 359 and that
FAS was rare among even babies of alcoholic women who drank
351. Id. at 119-31.
352. Id. at 123 & n.3.
353. Id. at 125.
354. See id. at 123.
355. See BRIGGS, supra note 174, at 95.
356. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE NEGRO FAMILY: THE CASE FOR NATIONAL ACTION (1965),
available at http://www.dol.gov/oasam/programs/history/moynchapter4.htm ("[T]he Negro
community has been forced into a matriarchal structure which, because it is to out of line with the
rest of the American society, seriously retards the progress of the group as a whole .... ").
357. KAARYN S. GUSTAFSON, CHEATING WELFARE: PUBLIC ASSISTANCE AND THE
CRIMINALIZATION OF POVERTY 35 (2011); see also Solangel Maldonado, Illegitimate Harm: Law
Stigma, and Discrimination Against Nonmarital Children, 63 FLA. L. REV. 345,367-68 (2011).
358. BRIGGS, supra note 174, at 99-108.
359. Id. at 100-01.
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excessively throughout their pregnancies,3 60 hundreds of women were
criminally prosecuted "and tens of thousands lost their children to foster
care."
361
In 1993, political scientist Charles Murray's influential Wall Street
Journal op-ed, The Coming White Underclass, raised the alarm that
unmarried white women were now having children at rates similar to those
of blacks in the 1960s and that society was doomed if this trend
continued.362 He claimed that fatherlessness produced young men who
were unteachable, unemployable, and ultimately criminal, and that a
society with a substantial proportion of such men "must be 'Lord of the
Flies' writ large."3 63 The reason for the trend: with the advent of welfare, a
single woman could actually afford to keep her child.364 The response:
"end all economic support for single mothers." 365 This, Murray argued,
would renew a healthy degree of stigma for the (newly impoverished)
mothers unable to enlist male support for their families and discourage
others from following in their path.366 What about the children now
deprived of financial support? First, "[t]here are laws already on the books
about the right of the state to take a child from a neglectful parent., 367
Second, adoption should be "easy for any married couple who can show
reasonable evidence of having the resources and stability to raise a
child."3 68
These successive campaigns shifted the blame for suffering children
from poverty and socioeconomic disadvantage to poor single mothers. By
the mid-1990s, these trends bore significant policy fruit as well. 369 In line
with Murray's urging, the effect of these policies was twofold-to take
away financial support from single mothers and then to offer adoption as
the solution for the children impoverished as a result.370 In 1996, the
360. Id. at 108.
361. Id. at 102, 107.
362. Charles Murray, The Coming White Underclass, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 29, 1993),
http://www.sullivan-county.com/racism/murrey.htm. Murray and other conservative academics had
been making similar arguments in their scholarship since the 1980s. See GUSTAFSON, supra note
357, at 38-39.
363. Murray, supra note 362.
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. See BRIGGS, supra note 174, at 115-17 (discussing Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich's
1994 welfare reiorm plan to put the children of mothers receiving Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AIC) in orphanages as part of the Contract with America and its implementation with
the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) and the
Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA)).
370. Id. at 116.
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Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
(PRWORA) sought to "end welfare as we know it." '371 PRWORA created
lifetime caps of five years (or less at a state's option) on receipt of welfare,
required women to work rather than take care of their children, authorized
states to cap welfare payments at a certain number of children, and
provided states with financial incentives to remove families from welfare
rolls.372 In 1996, the Interethnic Provisions of the Multiethnic Placement
Act (MEPA) prohibited consideration of race in placements of children for
foster care and adoption.373 Finally in 1997, the Adoption and Safe
Families Act (ASFA) sought to vastly increase adoption by: (1) terminating
federal funding for family reunification and requiring states to plan for
adoption if a child had not exited the child welfare system in fifteen
months; (2) providing substantial tax credits to adopting parents; and (3)
providing states with significant financial subsidies for each child adopted
from the system.3 74 In other words, biological families were stripped of
financial support, adoptive families were financially rewarded, and states
were incentivized to end welfare payments and move children into
adoptive homes.
In the campaign to increase adoptions, birth mothers are either invisible
or condemned.3 75 Harvard Law Professor Elizabeth Bartholet, an active
participant in the ASFA and MEPA debates, called her 1999 paean to
adoption Nobody's Children,376 erasing the parents of the child, and
echoing the old description of illegitimate children as filius nullius-
children of no one.377 Since then, members of the Christian Right adoption
movement have explicitly adopted thefilius nullius concept, asserting that
because the term "orphan" means fatherless child in the bible, children of
single mothers are by definition orphans, and therefore eligible for
adoption.378 The thousands of Christian Right "crisis pregnancy counseling
371. See Jason DeParle, Welfare Limits Left Poor Adrift as Recession Hit, N.Y. TimEs (Apr. 7,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/08/us/welfare-limits-left-poor-adrift-as-recession-hit.html
(quoting President Clinton, 1995 State of The Union Address, WASH. POST (Jan. 24, 1995),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/states/docs/sou95.htm).
372. See GUSTAFSON, supra note 357, at 44-47.
373. 42 U.S.C. § 1996b(1)(A) (2012).
374. See Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 670 (2012)). The tax
credits associated with ASFA are codified at 26 U.S.C. § 23.
375. See JOYCE, supra note 182, at xvi, 98; BRIGGS, supra note 174, at 16-17.
376. ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, NOBODY'S CHILDREN: ABUSE, NEGLECT, FOSTER CARE DRIFr AND
THE ADOPTION ALTERNATIVE (1999).
377. BRIGGS, supra note 174, at 17.
378. JOYCE, supra note 182, at 107. This translation of children with a single parent into
orphans may also be less explicit. For example, a book by Russell Moore, one of the founders of the
modem Christian Adoption movement, goes directly from a paragraph discussing the need to
persuade single mothers to choose adoption to the plight of the "orphan" (who apparently is likely
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centers," moreover, counsel single pregnant women that keeping an
illegitimate child is immature and emotional and leads to harm and neglect,
while choosing adoption is "a higher and less selfish form of love," and a
way to "[defeat] . . . 'evil' within themselves., 379 Many private adoption
facilitators are also affiliated with the Christian Right, including both the
Nightlight Christian Agency that helped arrange Veronica's adoption and
Raymond Godwin, the attorney who represented the Capobiancos in the
South Carolina courts and co-founded Carolina Christian Hope Adoption
Agency with his wife, Laura.38" (The name Nightlight may be familiar.
Nightlight was at the center of media attention when President George W.
Bush praised it as the pioneer of Snowflakes® Embryo Adoptions,
"adoptions" of embryos discarded during in vitro fertilization.)381
Unmarried fathers lost further rights in this period as well. Following
two high profile challenges to adoptions by unmarried fathers in the
1 990s,382 thirty-four states have now adopted putative father registries like
that upheld in Lehr, many providing unmarried fathers only thirty days
after a child's birth to register.383 South Carolina does not have a putative
father registry, but its statutes require unmarried fathers to show they either
to wind up a prostitute and later kill herself). RUSSELL D. MOORE, ADOPTED FOR LIFE: THE PRIORrrY
OF ADOPTION FOR CHRISTIAN FAMILIES AND CHURCHES 83 (2009).
379. JOYCE, supra note 182, at 115 (first alteration in original) (quoting CURTIS YOUNG,
FAMILY RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE MISSING PIECE: ADOPTION COUNSELING IN THE PREGNANCY
RESOURCE CENTERS (2000), available at http://www.heartbeatintemational.org/pdfmissing_
piece.pdf) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
380. See RAYMOND W. GODwIN, ATTORNEY AT LAW PC, http://www.scadopt.net (last visited
Jan. 12, 2015) (describing attorney Ray Godwin's experience with adoption and including a page
on "Miracles in Adoption" featuring an article describing adoption as "a very important concept for
a Jesus follower."(follow "Miracles in Adoption" hyperlink)). In 2007, Carolina Hope hired Dan
Cruver, one of the leading figures in the Christian adoption movement, as its Ministry Outreach
Coordinator. See Tim Brister, Dan Cruver and Carolina Hope Christian Adoption Agency, TIMMY
BRISTER BLOG (Aug. 17, 2007), http://timmybrister.com/2007/08/dan-cruver-and-carolina-hope-
christian-adoption-agency/.
Nightlight has now absorbed Carolina Hope, but Laura Godwin has remained at the helm of
the South Carolina branch. See Andrew Knapp, South Carolina Couple's Attorney Says Oklahoma
Tribe Never Expressed Interest Before Desaray's Birth, POST & COURIER (Sept. 13, 2013, 6:35
PM), http://www.postandcourier.com/article/20130913/PC 16/130919617 ("Godwin's wife [Laura]
ran Carolina Hope Christian Adoption Agency, which was absorbed into Nightlight in 2009.");
Adoption Counseling and Coaching Services, NIGHTLIGHT CHRISTIAN ADOPTIONS,
http://www.nightlight.org/post-adoption-counseling-services/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2015) (listing
Laura Godwin as the adoption counseling contact for the South Carolina branch of Nightlight).
381. Snowflakes Mentioned in President Bush 's "Decision Points, " NIGHTLIGHT CHRISTIAN
ADOPTIONS (Jan. 11, 2011), http://www.nightlight.org/2011/0 1/nightlight-christian-adoptions-
snowflakes-mentioned-in-president-bushs-decision-points/.
382. Laura Oren, Thwarted Fathers or Pop- Up Pops: How to Determine When Unmarried
Fathers Can Block the Adoption of Their Newborn Children, 40 FAM. L.Q. 153, 160-70 (2006).
383. Id. at 170-71, 180.
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lived with or supported their child or the child's mother in order to have
standing to object to adoption of their infant children. 384
. This shift is even clearer in the uniform laws on the subject. In 1988,
the drafters of the Uniform Putative and Unknown Fathers Act declined to
recommend a putative father registry, opining that "most fathers or
potential fathers-even very responsible ones-are not likely to know
about the registry." 385 Further, the Uniform Adoption Act of 1994, (which
has only been adopted in Vermont) required notice to all putative fathers,
but limited the fathers whose consent was necessary for adoption. 386 In
contrast, the Uniform Parentage Act of 2000 (adopted in part by eight
states) required an unmarried father to either register as a putative father or
file a suit to establish paternity to avoid losing any right to notice of
adoption of a child less than one year old.387 While states have not widely
adopted any of these uniform laws, this progression reveals the shift from a
modicum of protection of parental rights to an emphasis on quick and easy
adoption of desirable newborns. Only a minority of states have statutes that
permit unmarried fathers to assert rights if they can show they were
thwarted in their desire to parent or support a child.388 Notably, Oklahoma
is among those states. 389
Although South Carolina's statute does not create an exception for
thwarted fathers, the South Carolina Supreme Court found in Abernathy v.
Baby Boy390 that the constitution compelled such an exception to protect
the rights of fathers who had been denied the opportunity to parent. 39' The
facts of Abernathy are eerily similar to those in Adoptive Couple, including
the fact that the birth father was on active duty in the military, implored the
birth mother to marry him when he learned she was pregnant, and the birth
mother rejected his offer and later refused further contact from him.3 92 In
384. S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-9-310(A)(4)-(5) (2013).
385. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, art. 4, cmt. (2002).
386. UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 3-401(3) (1994). The Act also required consent of unmarried
fathers who had lived with or supported the child's mother or provided clear and convincing
evidence that they were "thwarted fathers." Id. § 2-401(1) cmt. (1994).
387. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 402 (2000).
388. Oren, supra note 382, at 173.
389. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10 § 7505-4.2 (2014); see also In re Baby Boy W., 988 P.2d 1270, 1271
(Okla. 1999).
390. 437 S.E.2d 25 (S.C. 1993).
391. Id. at 29.
392. Id. at 27, 29. There were facts in Abernathy not present in Adoptive Couple: while
overseas, the birth father gave the birth mother access to his bank account and car in case she
needed anything (she did not take advantage of these); he came to the hospital two days after the
birth, which is how he learned of the adoptive placement; and his calls to the birth mother were
persistent enough that she complained to her supervisor that he was harassing her. Id. While Brown
did not go this far, fathers should not have to stalk the mothers of their children in order to preserve
their parental rights.
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fact, in her September 29, 2011 order from the bench, family court Judge
Deborah Malphrus originally found that Brown was a thwarted father
under Abernathy and its progeny.393
Oddly, although no further evidence or pleadings were presented, Judge
Malphrus reversed this finding in her formal November 25, 2011 order,
and the South Carolina Supreme Court did not revisit the issue, resting its
opinion on lCWA alone.394 It seems even odder that in response to this
same set of facts, the Supreme Court majority declared not just once, but
seven times in its opinion, that Brown had "abandoned" his child.395 Given
the decades of law and policy treating noncustodial fathers as mere spoilers
keeping children from the blessings of legitimacy, however, that
conclusion was likely only too easy to reach.
The shift toward easy adoption and away from rights of biological
parents has not helped children, and in many cases has hurt them. Given
the demand for infants relinquished for adoption at birth and the reality that
many unmarried noncustodial fathers are not interested in parenting their
children, these legal changes are unlikely to have much effect on demand
or stability of adoption of newborns. And although the number of
adoptions from foster care has increased since 1996 to around 50,000 per
year, the percentage of children leaving foster care through adoption has
remained at about 20% since 2002.396 Rates of adoption from foster care,
moreover, began to increase rapidly before the enactment of ASFA,397 and
much of the recent increase is due to increases in adoptions by relatives.3 98
Because more than half of children still exit foster care by parental
393. Transcript of Record, supra note 30, at 14-15.
394. Email from Chrissi Nimmo, Assistant Attorney Gen., Cherokee Nation, to Bethany R.
Berger, Professor, Univ. of Conn. Sch. of Law (Feb. 2, 2014) (on file with author).
395. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2557, 2562 & n.7, 2563 & n.8 (2013).
396. CONNA CRAIG & DEREK HERBERT, NAT'L CTR. FOR POL'Y ANALYSIS, THE STATE OF THE
CHILDREN: AN EXAMINATION OF GOVERNMENT-RUN FOSTER CARE 7 (1997), available at
http://www.ncpa.org/pdfs/st210.pdf ("22,491 foster child adoptions were finalized in 47 states in
fiscal [year] 1996."); Admin. for Children, Youth & Families, Trends in Foster Care andAdoption
(FFY2002-FFY2012), U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. 3 (July 19,2013) [hereinafter Trends
in Foster Care and Adoption], http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/trends-fostercare
adoption20l2.pdf.
397. Trends in Foster Care and Adoption, supra note 396, at 1. The number of adoptions from
foster care has increased significantly since the passage of ASFA, but it was already increasing at a
rapid pace before ASFA was enacted. Frank A. Biafora & Dawn Esposito, Adoption Data and
Statistical Trends, in HANDBOOK OF ADOPTION: IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCHERS, PRACTITIONER,
AND FAMILIES 39 (Rafael A. Javier, Amanda L. Baden, Frank A. Biafora, & Alina Camacho-
Gingerich eds., 2007). Each year, moreover, almost twice as many children are waiting for adoption
as are actually adopted from foster care. See id.; Trends in Foster Care and Adoption, supra note
396, at 1.
398. Moriguchi, supra note 180, at 6 (noting that 23% of adoptions from foster care in 2007
were to related adoptive parents).
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reunification,399 shifting federal funds from family preservation to adoption
lessens the chance that these children receive effective parenting. 400 Nor
did the legal changes reduce the number of children in foster care. In 2006,
the number of children in foster care was 505,000, compared to 507,000 in
1996 when ASFA was adopted.40' Since 2006, the number has dropped to
approximately 400,000, but this reduction is wholly accounted for by the
smaller number of children entering the system.402
Meanwhile, cuts to welfare for needy families have affected millions of
poor children. If successful in helping poor mothers achieve economic
well-being, PRWORA would have truly benefitted both women and
children. Not surprisingly given its origins in hysteria regarding
illegitimacy and welfare cheats, PRWORA was not well designed to do so.
Although work requirements were mandatory, states were not required to
provide childcare for working mothers or count education (which might
qualify women for well-paying jobs) as work.4 03 Once jobs dried up during
the recession, lifetime limits left families in abject poverty.40 4
In essence, in the name of reducing illegitimacy and helping children in
foster care, the United States has enacted a system that limits the rights of
all birth parents in adoptions, reduces parenting support for the birth
families to which most foster children will return, and undermines stable
incomes and child care for many more poor families. These measures have
slightly increased the small percentage of children who exit foster care
through adoption but have had no effect on the vast majority of children in
399. Trends in Foster Care andAdoption, supra note 396, at 3; ADMIN. ON CHILDREN, YoUTH
& FAMILIES, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD WELFARE OUTCOMES 1998: ANNUAL
REPORT 4-3 (2000), available at http://archive.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/pubs/cwo98/cwo98.pdf.
400. See ROBERTS, supra note 298, at 103 (opining that emphasis on "freeing" foster children
for adoption may exacerbate racism in the child welfare system).
401. Trends in Foster Care andAdoption, supra note 396, at 1; STAFF OF H. COMM. ON WAYS
AND MEANS, 106TH CONG., 2000 GREEN BOOK: BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND DATA ON THE
PROGRAMS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 718-19 (Comm.
Print 2000), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-CPRT- 1 06WPRT6171 0/pdf/GPO-
CPRT-106WPRT61710-2-12.pdf. But see ADMIN. OF CHILDREN, YOUTH & FAMILIES, U.S. DEP'T
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE AFCARS REPORT: PRELIMINARY FY 2006 ESTIMATES AS OF
JANUARY 2008, at 1 (2008), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/afcarsreportl4.pdf
(offering a slightly different preliminary estimate for number of children in foster care as of
September 30, 2006).
402. See Trends in Foster Care and Adoption, supra note 396, at 1 (displaying a table showing
that since FY2006, an average of 34,500 fewer children per year (or a total of 242,000 fewer
children) have entered foster care). Increasing ratios of exit from foster care to entry have little
impact. Between 2006 and 2012, only about 1,571 more children exit than enter per year (a 0.6%
difference). See id. For the entire decade between 2002 and 2012, moreover, an average of 5,270
more children entered than exited foster care each year (a 1.85% difference). See id.
403. See GUSTAFSON, supra note 357, at 45-46.
404. DeParle, supra note 371.
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the system. Adoptive Couple was decided against the backdrop of the false
narrative that adoption is the cure for illegitimacy and poverty, unmarried
parents who object to adoption are irresponsible and uncaring, and that
parental rights and procedural safeguards will block the hungry tide of
prospective adoptive parents. No part of this narrative supports the rights
or interests of women or their children.
V. ECONOMICS
Of course, the narrative of children's interests has gained currency
against a backdrop of powerful economic interests. States are ostensibly
interested in encouraging adoption of low-income children by higher-
income families to reduce state welfare rolls. Further, private adoption
agencies and attorneys who facilitate most adoptions in the United States
are interested in maintaining a steady supply of completed adoptions on
behalf of the parents who pay them. Finally, the trends toward expensive
private adoptions and later childbearing for upper-middle-class women
have ensured a growing economic divide between adoptive and birth
parents.
A. State Interests
Charles Murray's linking of adoption and the end of welfare was
nothing new. Adoption has long been proposed as a magic bullet to solve
the problems of poverty, and policies to increase the number of adoptions
often go hand in hand with efforts to reduce welfare rolls.40 5 Because most
needs-based welfare assistance is tied to the support for minor children,40 6
removing the children often means removing financial support. These
policies were not directly at issue in Adoptive Couple-while the state paid
for her medical services, Maldonado was employed as a casino worker by
the Osage Tribe,' 07 and Brown was first a soldier and then working in
private security while serving in the National Guard4 8-but they helped to
shaped the legal and policy background of the case.
As Professor Laura Briggs has documented, American Indian children,
like African American children, became targets for child welfare removals
after they began receiving state-financed welfare assistance in large
numbers. 40 9 Native children had always been vulnerable to removal from
405. See, e.g., JOYCE, supra note 182, at 45 (describing "orphan trains" of the 1880s to the
1920s shipping urban immigrant children from American cities to be adopted by Protestant farmers
to relieve pressure on public support).
406. Brynne Keith-Jennings, SNAP Plays a Critical Role in Helping Children, CTR. ON
BUDGET & POL'Y PRIORITIES (July 17,2012), http://www.cbpp.org/cms/?fa=view&id=3805.
407. See Brewer, Some Disturbing Facts, supra note 39.
408. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 731 S.E.2d 550, 553 n.2 (S.C. 2012)
409. BRIGGS, supra note 174, at 7-8.
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their families, from the earliest colonial efforts to obtain children as
hostages and subjects of acculturation to the nineteenth and early twentieth
century federal and religious efforts to place children in boarding schools
where they could be separated from uncivilized tribal influences.41 ° But
these efforts were not focused on adoption-instead, Indian children would
be taught to be non-Indians and then released to support themselves and
provide an example to their families. Economic assistance did not come
from states or municipalities, but was provided by the federal Indian
Department (later the BIA) in the form of rations doled out by reservation
agents pursuant to treaty agreements. 411 There were links between
economic assistance and child removal-parents could have their rations
docked if they did not send their children to school 4l 2-but they were
largely indirect.
The Social Security Act of 1935413 required states to provide Aid to
Families with Dependent Children to all eligible families in the state,
imposing some uniformity on the disparate, poor relief programs provided
by states, municipalities, and private charities. 414 Although states and
counties vigorously resisted provision of welfare to families on
reservations, 415 by the 1950s, Indian children and families started receiving
state welfare assistance, and, with it, contact with state social workers.416
This began a tide of children flowing from reservations into the child
welfare system and from there into white adoptive homes." 7 The BIA
encouraged this tide with its Indian Adoption Project, which placed a
federal stamp of approval on child removal as a response to poverty of
Indian children.41 8 In the 1960s, in response to pleas by mothers and
grandmothers, the Association of American Indian Affairs began holding
press conferences and litigating cases across the country regarding the
casual removal of Indian children from their families.419 In 1974, Congress
began holding hearings on the issue; finally, after four years of hearings
410. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 1.04 (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds.,
2012).
411. Id. § 22.0611].
412. Id.; 25 U.S.C. § 283 (2012).
413. Pub. L. No. 74-271,49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
414. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(10)(A) (1994) (repealed 1996).
415. See, e.g., Acosta v. San Diego Cnty., 272 P.2d 92, 93-94 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1954); State
ex rel. Williams v. Kamp, 78 P.2d 585, 587 (Mont. 1938); State Bd. of Pub. Welfare v. Bd. of
Comm'rs, 137 S.E.2d 801, 801-03 (N.C. 1964).
416. BRIGGS, supra note 174, at 71.
417. Id.
418. PRUCHA, supra note 259, at 1154.
419. BRIGGS, supra note 174, at 77-82.
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without action, the Indian Child Welfare Act was enacted in 1978.420
A similar history unfolded with respect to African Americans, who
began to swell child welfare rolls in the 1960s just as civil rights advocacy
and legal changes made them eligible for such benefits in large numbers
for the first time.42' Although white families have always comprised the
majority of those receiving welfare in the United States, by the 1980s, the
black, unmarried, "welfare queen" had become the powerful image of
welfare in the United States.422 Removing children from these women
would end both their entitlement to economic support and the threat of
social contagion from these demonized mothers to their children.423
But removing children from their families does not actually make
economic sense. First, it is expensive to keep children in foster care, and
relatively few foster children exit through adoption by middle-income
families.424 But ASFA created federal subsidies for adoptions from foster
care that can incentivize states to remove the children and seek adoption
anyway.425 These subsidies are higher-as much as three times higher-for
"special needs" children; South Dakota, the target of a recent investigation
for its removals of Indian children and noncompliance with ICWA, has
designated all Indian children as special needs children.426 (As an aside,
Veronica was labeled a special needs child because of her mixed race
heritage, resulting in a larger adoption tax credit to the Capobiancos.) 427 At
least officially, moreover, states did not support the adoptive couple's
position in this case. As discussed above, eighteen states-not including
South Dakota or Oklahoma, but including many other states with high
Indian populations-filed an amicus brief in support of the birth father and
the procedures required by ICWA.428 The perceived links between
adoption, child welfare, and state financial assistance, however, likely
helped shape the legal and policy assumptions Brown faced in the Supreme
Court.
420. Id. at 90-91.
421. Id. at 38--41.
422. See supra note 357 and accompanying text.
423. See supra Section IV.B.
424. See supra Part II.
425. See ROBERTS, supra note 298, at 110.
426. Laura Sullivan & Amy Walters, Incentives and Cultural Bias Fuel Foster System, NPR
(Oct. 25, 2011), http://www.npr.org/201 1/10/25/141662357/incentives-and-cultural-bias-fuel-
foster-system.
427. Email from Chrissi Nimmo, Assistant Attorney Gen., Cherokee Nation, to Bethany R.
Berger, Professor, Univ. of Conn. Sch. of Law (Mar. 18, 2014) (on file with author). See 26 U.S.C.
§ 23(a)(3) (2012) (allowing adoption credit of $10,000 over actual adoption expenses for special
needs children).
428. Brief of the States, supra note 25, at at 3-4.
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B. Adoption Industry Interests
More powerful than state interests were those of the adoption industry,
whose business model depends on infant adoptions. Private entities have
long sought to profit from families wishing to adopt. Indeed, governments
and nonprofits only began coordinating adoptions in the 1900s after
unlicensed "baby brokers" started trying to fulfill the demand.4 29 Even after
official organizations got into the business, scandals over "baby snatching"
and "baby buying" gained congressional attention in the 1920s and
1950s. 430 Both adoption facilitators and adoptive parents, however, fended
off proposals to create federal regulation of the industry, leaving private
adoptions to lighter state regulation.431
Although private adoptions have long generated concern, one difference
has an enormous impact on the economic interests in adoptions.
Historically, adoptions accompanied by the exchange of money were
considered illegal or "black market" adoptions.432 Although adopting
parents were encouraged to make donations to adoption agencies,
adoptions were not themselves a source of profit.433 Even when agencies
began to charge fees, as late as the 1970s these fees were often on a sliding
scale based on the income of the adopters.434
Today, of course, things are different, with costs amounting to tens of
thousands of dollars, and sometimes much more, for adopting an infant.435
In the words of political economist and Barnard College President Debora
Spar, "despite the heartfelt sentiments of parents and providers, there is a
flourishing market for both children and their component parts.... and
many individuals are profiting handsomely. 43 6 Although many agree that
adoption is now a market,437 "the baby market does not operate like other
429. DEBORA L. SPAR, THE BABY BUSINESS: How MONEY, SCIENCE, AND POLITICS DRIVE THE
COMMERCE OF CONCEPTION 166-67 (2006).
430. FREUNDLICH, supra note 177, at 9-10; ADOPTION AND ETHIcs: THE MARKET FORCES IN
ADOPTION 9 (2000); SPAR, supra note 429, at 172.
431. SPAR, supra note 429, at 172.
432. FREUNDLICH, supra note 177, at 9.
433. Id. at 13-14.
434. Elizabeth Landes & Richard Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL
STuD. 323, 330 (1978).
435. See Baccara, supra note 20, at 2 (noting that the average cost of infant adoption in 2009
was $32,000); Mansnerus, supra note 21 (reporting adoptions costing up to $100,000).
436. SPAR, supra note 429, at xv (writing both about adoption and fertility practice); see also
id. at 160 ("[O]f course, baby selling is illegal.... In practice, though, adoption is indeed a market,
particularly in its international dimensions.").
437. See, e.g., FREUNDLICH, supra note 177, at 3; Michele B. Goodwin, Preface to BABY
MARKETS, supra note 186, at xiii; JEANNE A. HOWARD, EVAN B. DONALDSON ADOPTION INST.,
UNTANGLING THE WEB: THE INTERNET'S TRANSFORMATIVE IMPACT ON ADOPTION 4 (Adam Pertman
ed., 2012), available at http://adoptioninstitute.org/old/publications/2012_12_Untanglingthe
Web.pdf (finding a "growing 'commodification' of adoption and a shift away from the perspective
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markets do. There are differential prices that make little sense; scale
economies that don't bring lower costs; and customers who will literally
pay whatever they possibly can."4 38
Melanie Duncan's testimony gives some insight into the multiplicity of
private entities involved in a typical adoption. The Capobiancos decided to
work with a private attorney rather than an agency, but wound up working
with multiple agencies, with attorney Raymond Godwin essentially acting
as a contractor managing many interests. 439 First, there was Adoption
Advertising, Inc., to which they paid $8,700 to connect them to
Maldonado. 440 There was also over $2,000 to Adoption Advocacy, Inc. for
pre- and post-placement home studies.44 1 Then there was Phyllis
Zimmerman, the attorney they hired to represent Maldonado in the case.442
Godwin also contracted on their behalf to have Nightlight Christian
Adoption Agency, whose South Carolina office is run by his wife, conduct
the birth family study.443 Through Godwin, the Capobiancos also paid for a
number of Maldonado's "expenses" including her rent, utility, and car
payments.4 " In her testimony, Melanie Duncan initially guessed that they
had spent $20,000 to $40,000 for the adoption before the litigation arose,
but later, when asked if this was all, said, "I don't even want to speculate.
It's going to be more than that... I know that's a low figure. 4 45
Not surprisingly, the number and kind of entities offering private
adoption services have multiplied since the advent of fees for adoptions."
6
One study by the National Adoption Information Clearinghouse found that
the number increased by several hundred just between 1995 and 1998,
reaching a total of 1764. 44 Today, the internet exponentially increases the
number and diversity of entities facilitating adoption.44 8 There are,
however, no uniform national statistics regarding adoption service
providers, or even consistent tracking of the total number and kind of
that its primary purpose is to find families for children"); Sanford Katz, Dual Systems ofAdoption
in the United States, in CROSS CURRENTS: FAMILY LAW AND POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES AND
ENGLAND 284 (Sanford Katz et al. eds., 2000); QuIRoz, supra note 187, at 6 (describing adoption as
"a business driven by market forces").
438. SPAR, supra note 429, at xvi.
439. Testimony of Adoptive Mother, supra note 53, at 171:19-24.
440. Id. at 191:13-21,
441. Id. at 190:16-24.
442. Id. at 173:19-25.
443. Id. at 178:3-5.
444. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, No. 2009-DR-10-03803, at 14 (S.C. Fain. Ct. Sept. 29,
2011).
445. Testimony of Adoptive Mother, supra note 53, at 189:13-16, 198:22-199:4.
446. See FREUNDLICH, supra note 177, at 3.
447. See Mansnerus, supra note 21.
448. See HowARD, supra note 437, at 4-5.
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private adoptions.449
Although the different entities providing adoption services are in
professional competition, 45 their business model depends on two things:
adoptable infants and completed adoptions. The ability to link adoption to
the personal and romanticized realm of family formation has shielded the
market aspects of adoption providing a powerful narrative for those
seeking a regulatory environment that protects their interests.451 The
National Council for Adoption (NCFA), for example, was formed in the
1980s when private adoption agencies banded together to prevent federal
promulgation of a Model State Adoption Act, which would have provided
for open adoptions and mandated that a mother could not finally agree to
relinquishment until two weeks after birth.452 After defeating the proposal,
the NCFA contributed substantially to the Uniform Adoption Act of
1994,453 which provides for permanently sealed adoption records,
relinquishment for adoption immediately after birth, and limited rights of
unmarried fathers.454 The NCFA has also been charged with successfully
opposing federal regulation that would set limits on adoption fees. 455
The result of this successful advocacy is that, although all states
regulate private adoptions to some degree, many claim the industry is
largely unregulated.456 These regulations also vary widely from state to
state, with some states known for loose adoption regulations.457 South
Carolina, for example, was known as a haven for lax adoption practices in
the 1980s; although the laws have changed since then, some claim the
reputation remains valid.45 8 A telling example of the light regulation
possible is the comment by Russell Moore, a prominent proponent of the
Christian adoption movement, that the local humane society had refused to
allow his family to have a cat, noting that they had been "qualified by the
Commonwealth of Kentucky to be fit to adopt two children but not one
449. See QutROz, supra note 187, at 10.
450. See Katz, supra note 437, at 283-85.
451. See Kimberly D. Kraswiec, Price and Pretense in the Baby Market, in BABY MARKETS,
supra note 186, at 42.
452. Mission, NAT'L COUNCIL FOR ADOPTION, https://www.adoptioncouncil.org/who-we-are/
mission.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2015).
453. Federal Adoption Policy, NAT'L COUNCIL FOR ADOPTION, https://www.adoptioncouncil.
org/who-we-are/mission/Federal-Adoption-Policy (last visited Jan. 12, 2015).
454. UNIF. ADOPTION ACT §§ 2-401, 2-404, 6-102, 6-104 (1994).
455. See BRIGGS, supra note 174, at 113.
456. See Michele Bratcher Goodwin, Baby Markets, in BABY MARKETS, supra note 186, at 5;
MIRAH REBEN, THE STORK MARKET: AMERICA'S MULTI-BILION DOLLAR UNREGULATED INDUSTRY, at
xviii-xix (2007) (quoting various critiques of the adoption industry's lack of regulation).
457. See BRIGGS, supra note 174, at 115; Mansnerus, supra note 21.
458. See Andrew Knapp, Skeptics of Veronica, Desaray cases call for closer look at private
adoptions, laws, POST & COURIER (Sept. 22, 2013, 3:32 PM), http://www.postandcourier.com/art
icle/20130921/PC 16/130929823.
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cat., 4 59 Ironically, Moore intended this as a condemnation of the humane
society,4 60 rather than the system in place to ensure adequate families for
children.
ICWA may serve children, tribal, and parental interests, but it is
contrary to the interests of private providers. ICWA's placement
preferences will likely result in a child becoming entirely unavailable for a
high-priced adoption, and being placed instead with a family unlikely to
afford the agency fees.461 In an outrageous recent case, a private adoption
agency even claimed "good cause" for deviation from the placement
preferences after demanding that, to be eligible, any families from the
child's tribe had to be able to pay the agency's $27,500 fee.462 In addition,
by providing birth parents with additional protections in voluntary
adoptions, and increasing the rights of birth fathers to consent at all, ICWA
may result in refusals to consent to adoption or revocations of initial
consent. In general, ICWA reflects a different era of adoption law, one in
which the United States was coming to terms with the harms of closed,
coerced adoptions of nonmarital children, and before the focus of adoption
practice shifted from finding homes for needy children to finding children
for infertile couples.4 6 3 It is not surprising that both the NCFA and the
American Academy of Adoption Attorneys filed amicus briefs on behalf of
the Capobiancos, 464 and celebrated the result.465
C. Class and Paths to Parenthood
The most obvious economic factor in Adoptive Couple was the way
class divided the birth parents and the prospective adoptive parents,
replicating the divides between relinquishing and adoptive parents in
private adoptions generally. These divides mean both that the upper-
middle-class people who make and implement rules regarding adoption-
lawyers, judges, and legislators-will find it easier to empathize with
adoptive parents, and that many people of all classes will see adopters as
better parents. They help to explain why Dusten Brown-a decorated war
459. MOORE, supra note 378, at 116.
460. See id.
461. Brief of Wisconsin Tribes as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 37, Adoptive
Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013) (No. 12-399).
462. In re T.S.W., 276 P.3d 133, 137, 144 (Kan. 2012).
463. See, e.g., Katz, supra note 437, at 284 ("[T]he forces that have been successful in
promoting private adoption are... [those] whose focus is on locating a child forparents rather than
parents for a child.").
464. Brief of Amicus Curiae American Academy of Adoption Attorneys in Support of Writ of
Certiorari, Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (No. 12-399); Brief of Amici Curiae National council
for Adoption in Support of Petitioners, Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (No. 12-399).
465. See Equal Justice Under the Lawfor Kids, Too, NAT'L COUNCIL FOR ADOPTION (June 26,
2013), http://www.adoptioncouncil.org/blog/2013/06/equal-justice-under-the-law-for-kids-too.
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veteran, supposedly one of America's heroes-was so roundly condemned
by observers, including the Supreme Court itself, and why it was so easy to
sell a misleading narrative about the facts of the case.
Infertility was once primarily a matter of biology, affecting the well-off
and the poor alike, if not disproportionately the poor because of the health
effects of disadvantage. Dramatic advances in. reproductive technology
have reduced the incidence of infertility, again with particular benefit to
those with the ability to pay. As opportunities began to open for working
women, however, neither the economies of the workplace nor those of the
home shifted to accommodate care for children. 466 In response, women
with significant educational and career opportunities began to delay
childbearing to balance the demands on their time.467 The result was a
growth in structural rather than biological infertility, disproportionately
affecting upper-middle-class women.468 The demand for adoption, once
distributed relatively equally across the working and middle class, now
took a decisive class shift. At the same time, the shift to expensive private
agency adoptions meant that infant adoption was placed out of reach for
most working-class families.469
The three youngest Supreme Court Justices illustrate this trend. The
two women, Justice Elena Kagan and Justice Sotomayor are both
unmarried and without children. The man-Chief Justice Roberts-
married another high-powered lawyer when they were both in their forties
and adopted two children.470 In fact, Chief Justice Roberts has experienced
the controversy arising from stringent adoption requirements first hand, as
right-wing conspiracy fanatics seized on the fact that his children are from
Ireland (a country that does not permit nonresidents to adopt),471 to allege
that President Obama used the supposed illegality of the adoptions to
466. See BRIGGS, supra note 174, at 96-97.
467. See id.; see also KAY HYMOWITZ ET AL., KNOTYET: THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF DELAYED
MARRIAGE IN AMERICA 3, 6 (2013) (noting that the trend in delaying marriage has significant
economic benefits for all women, but those without a college education are having children without
marriage).
468. BRIGGS, supra note 174, at 96-97.
469. See Goodwin, Baby Markets, supra note 456, at 9 (noting that financial status is a
significant factor in adoption decision-making).
470. Joan Biskupic, Roberts Plays Dual Roles: Chief Justice and Father, USA TODAY (June
25, 2006, 11:15 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-06-25-roberts_x.htm;
Christina Wilkie, Jane Roberts, Chief Justice John Roberts'Spouse, Breaks the Mold of Supreme
Court Wives, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 9,2012,4:16 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/
09/jane-roberts-john-roberts-supreme-court_n1 760726.html.
471. Adoption Act 2010 (Act No. 21/2010) (Ir.) § 33(5), available at http://www.irishstatutebo
ok.ie/pdf/2010/en.act.2010.0021.pdf.
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blackmail Roberts into voting to uphold the Affordable Care Act.472
Adoption has become not just a matter of class, but also a matter of
gender equality, and even reproductive rights.473 Adoption has permitted
women to devote themselves to their education and careers and yet also be
mothers. Indeed, even as low-income single mothers became demonized in
the media, another group, so-called "single mothers by choice," largely
well-educated, professional women who choose to have children on their
own, has grown and gained significant acceptance and influence since
former Vice-President Dan Quayle's attack on Murphy Brown. 474 A telling
example of this is Elizabeth Bartholet, a Harvard Law professor who wrote
about employment discrimination before becoming a transracial adoption
advocate after she adopted two Peruvian boys as a single mother in the
1 980s.475 Adoption gained more traction as a civil and reproductive rights
question as the LGBT movement raised claims regarding the rights of
same-sex families to adopt and parent.476 Of course the foil for all of these
claims was that children would benefit by moving into middle-class
families, even if those families were nonbiological, older, female-headed,
472. Was Chief Justice Roberts Blackmailed into Supporting Obamacare? Maybe.,
MRCONSERVATIVE (May 18, 2013, 7:23 PM), http://mrconservative.com/2013/05/16722-was-chief-
justice-roberts-blackmailed-into-supporting-obamacare-maybe/.
473. See BRIGGS, supra note 174, at 97.
474. See, e.g., Mikki Morissette, A Response to Ann Coulter, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 12,
2009, 5:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mikki-morrissette/a-response-to-ann-coulter-b-
157078.html (critiquing Anne Coulter's attack on single motherhood, but only because it did not
account for middle-class single mothers by choice like her). Full disclosure: I am a "single mother
by choice," albeit not by adoption, and have a son six months younger than Veronica. I had several
friends and acquaintances who were already single mothers by choice that I could ask about the
process before I got pregnant. I have gotten nothing but support for my decision, and some
questions from parents of thirty-something daughters about whether they could refer their daughters
to me. It was not until a friend, who became an informal guardian and adoptive mother to a young
woman who aged out of foster care and got pregnant and raised her child, told me she didn't like
the sobriquet "single mothers by choice" because it denigrated those who did not choose to get
pregnant, but did choose to have their children, that I realized the class distinction implicit in the
phrase.
475. See Elizabeth Bartholet, Application of Title Vllto Jobs in High Places, 95 HARv. L. REv.
945, 945 (1982); Elizabeth Bartholet, Proof ofDiscriminatory Intent Under Title VII: United States
Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 70 CALIF. L. REv. 1201, 1201 (1982); Kevin Voigt,
International Adoption: Saving Orphans or Child Trafficking?, CNN WORLD (Sept. 18, 2013, 2:41
PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/16/world/intemational-adoption-saving-orphans-child-traffick
ing/ (stating that Elizabeth Bartholet adopted children from Peru in the 1980s).
476. See, e.g., Howard v. Child Welfare Agency Review Bd., No. CV 1999-9881, 2004 WL
3154530, at *1, *13 (Ark. Cir. Ct. Dec. 29, 2004) (invalidating Arkansas' exclusion of gay people
as foster parents), aff'dsub nom. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Howard, 238 S.W.3d I (Ark. 2006); Fla.
Dep't of Children & Families v. Adoption of X.X.G., 45 So. 3d 79, 92 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)
(invalidating Florida's statute prohibiting adoption of children by homosexual foster parents);
BRIGGS, supra note 174, at 97.
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or LGBT.477 While this narrative is usually true-willing, caring parents
are always better than unwilling, incapable, or abusive ones-this does not
undermine its class dimensions or justify diminishing the rights of birth
families who may be less wealthy but are fully able to love and care for
their children.
This class narrative affected the Adoptive Couple case from the
beginning.478 Christinna Maldonado selected the Capobiancos because
"they're a mother and father that live inside a home where she can look up
to them and they can give her everything she needs when needed. 4 79 Jo
Prowell, the Guardian ad Litem who followed the case to the Supreme
Court, resisted repeated requests by the Browns and their attorney to
conduct a home study of the Browns. They testified that, when she did
conduct the study, she told them about how well educated the Capobiancos
were, what a beautiful home they had, and how they could send Veronica
to any private school and college they chose.48 ° She allegedly said that they
needed to "get down on [their] knees and pray to ...make the right
decision for this baby., 481 The South Carolina Supreme Court, although it
ruled against the Capobiancos, called them "ideal parents. ' '482 Dusten
Brown, despite his loving and supportive parents, close relationship with
his other daughter, and decorated military service, could only be less than
477. The median income of adoptive parents has been consistently higher than the median
income of biological parents ever since the government began tracking such data in 2000. See ROSE
M. KREIDER & DAPHNE A. LOFQUIST, U.S. CENsus BUREAU, ADOPTED CHILDREN AND STEPCHILDREN:
2010, at 17 (2014), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2014pubs/p20-572.pdf (listing the
median household income for adopted children under eighteen at $73,000 and the same figure for
biological children at $60,000); ROSE M. KREIDER, U.S. CENsus BUREAU, ADOPTED CHILDREN AND
STEPCHILDREN: 2000, at 17 (2000), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/censr-6.pdf
(listing the median household income for adopted children under 18 at $56,000 and the same figure
for biological children at $48,000).
478. A recent HarvardLaw Review commentary thus misses the point in arguing that the point
of contention in the case is between biological and affective definitions of family. See Indian Child
Welfare Act-Termination of Parental Rights-Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 127 HARV. L. REv.
368 (2013). Although the piece is correct that changing definitions of the family and the demotion
of biology in many people's lives is important, see id. at 377, it misses the profound implications of
the line the Court chose to draw here for historically disadvantaged families, biological or not, and
the prioritization of marital families over even affective families in cases like Michael H. v. Gerald
D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989), and Nguyen v. i.N.S., 533 U.S. 53,73 (2001) (holding that a son born out
of wedlock in Vietnam but who had resided in the U.S. with his citizen father for years could not
claim citizenship through his father, although one could claim citizenship through a citizen mother
in similar circumstances). See supra notes 344-50 and accompanying text. The class and
disadvantage-based implications of this line explain why the majority was dominated by the
conservative members of the Court, while the minority by the progressive members.
479. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 731 S.E.2d 550, 553 (S.C. 2012).
480. See Transcript of Record, supra note 30, at 513, 568.
481. See id. at 513, 570.
482. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 567.
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"ideal." In the media circus the Capobiancos' public relations team created,
he became just another deadbeat dad who was careless with his sperm and
bad for his daughter, while the Capobiancos were the parents to which any
right-thinking father would give his child.
CONCLUSION
On October 10, 2013, two weeks after relinquishing Veronica to the
Capobiancos, Brown decided to end all appeals in the case.483 Holding
back tears, he said, "I cannot bear to continue it any longer ... I love her
too much to continue to have her in the spotlight., 484 Baby Girl is now, and
will likely remain, Veronica Capobianco.
Although there was no hearing about what would be in Veronica's best
interests, one can hope that she will come out of this well. In general,
adoptees, including transracial adoptees, have similar outcomes to
nonadoptees, 485 and there is nothing to suggest that the Capobiancos will
not provide her with a stable, loving family. While transracial adoptees
grapple with distinctive ethnic identity issues, with supportive families
they otherwise thrive.486 Indian adoptees, in particular, struggle with
identity issues and sometimes suffer serious harms as a result, but they
usually do well so long as their adoptive families are open and supportive
of their Indian identities and relationship to their Indian families. 487 The
brutal legal and media battle that pitted the Capobiancos against the
Browns and the Cherokee Nation, of course, makes it harder to imagine
483. Overall, supra note 101.
484. Id.
485. See HOLLEE McGINNIS ET AL., EvAN B. DONALDSON ADOPTION INSTITUTE, BEYOND
CULTURE CAMP: PROMOTING HEALTH IDENTITY FORMATION IN ADOPTION 9 (Adam Pertman ed.,
2009), available at http://adoptioninstitute.org/old/publications/20091 l BeyondCultureCamp.pdf.
486. See id. at 5-7, 17-19 (reporting results of a study comparing Korean and White adoptees,
and summarizing studies regarding adoption generally).
487. See RITA J. SIMON & SARAH HERNANDEZ, NATIVE AMERICAN TRANSRACIAL ADOPTEES
TELL THEIR STORIES (2008) (collecting interviews in which many, despite reports of happy
childhoods and enhanced opportunities through adoption, speak of struggles with Indian identity
and the sense that Indian children should ideally be placed with Indian families); Rita Sindelar,
Negotiating Indian Identity: Native Americans and Transracial Adoption, at 50-51 (Aug. 2004)
(unpublished Master's Dissertation, Loyola University Chicago) (on file with Lewis Library, Loyola
University Chicago). The UN Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples has also raised
concerns about the denial of Veronica's right to cultural identity, USA/Indigenous Peoples: UN
Expert Urges Respect for the Rights of Cherokee Child in Custody Dispute, UNITED NATIONS OFF.
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HuM. RTS. (Sept. 10, 2013), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/
Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID = 13695&LangIE; see also Kristen A. Carpenter & Lorie
Graham, Human Rights to Culture, Family, & Self-Determination: The Case of Adoptive Couple v.
Baby Girl, in INDIGENOUS PEOPLE AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Stefan Kirchner & Joan Policastri eds.
forthcoming 2015), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssm.2401886 (discussing human rights
concerns).
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that relationship developing. In particular, the Capobiancos' decision to
serve Brown and the Cherokee Nation with a demand for half a million
dollars for attorney's fees and costs two days after Brown relinquished
Veronica488 (and file a new demand for over one million dollars a month
later)489 seems gratuitously vindictive, particularly because the attorneys
worked pro bono.
For the Browns, of course, this is a tragedy that will last a lifetime.
Studies of single mothers coerced into relinquishing their children find
lifelong grief similar to that caused by the death of a child.490 Like them,
the Browns have lost a child against their will, and will likely always feel
the effects.
But Veronica is just one little girl, and the Browns are just one family.
More troubling than the impact of this case on the participants is the
potential impact on all members of the adoption triad-children, birth
parents, and adoptive parents. The decision, particularly without Justice
Breyer's gloss on it,49 1 has the potential to wipe out LCWA rights of almost
all Indian birth fathers and even birth mothers who do not have legal
custody of their children. In private adoption cases, it provides a neat
loophole to evade the requirement to seek suitable families within the
child's extended family or tribe. And although the Court did not adopt the
existing Indian family exception, the decision may breathe new life into
what had become a dying and discredited doctrine.492
The decision also sanctions dubious tactics like those practiced here,
evading proper notice under the law until the long illegal placement of a
child could ripen into a legal right to remain. Because the Supreme Court
left untouched the requirement that all parents receive notice of adoptions
under ICWA,493 there will be other parents that learn of these unsanctioned
placements and challenge them, just as Brown did, with the potential for
more disruption and heartache for their children and prospective and birth
families.
488. Suzette Brewer, Capobiancos Sue Dusten Brown for Nearly Half a Million in Fees,
INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Sept. 25, 2013), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com
/2013/09/25/capobiancos-sue-dusten-brown-nearly-half-million-fees- 151444.
489. Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs and Brief in Support, supra note 1.
490. JOYCE, supra note 182, at 93.
491. See supra notes 143, 164 and accompanying text.
492. The decision has already been repeatedly cited regarding the limitations of the application
of ICWA to noncustodial mothers and fathers. See, e.g., In re Elise W., No. A136845, 2014 WL
98674, at *9 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. Jan. 10, 2014) (using Adoptive Couple to argue for the
limitation of applicability of ICWA to termination of a mother's rights because the mother was non-
Indian and the Indian father never had custody of the child); In re Laird, No. 315895, 2014 WL
308868, at *3 n.4 (Mich. App. 2014) (using Adoptive Couple as affirmation of an earlier decision
that active efforts were not required when family was already broken up at the time of the petition).
493. See 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) (2012).
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Ultimately, the decision and its aftermath place the stamp of approval
on a long process of recasting adoption as a system to provide children to
well-off families, while framing measures that accomplish that goal as
furthering the children's interests. This reframing threatens all vulnerable
communities and families. For Native communities-small, without the
resources to pay hefty adoption fees, and struggling with generations of
child removals-the impact is even greater. For them, the false narratives
surrounding this case have combined to condone and perpetuate centuries
of real intergenerational loss.
